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In its most fundamental sense, respect may be defined as an
interrelation among individual human beings in which they reciprocally honor each other's freedom of choice about participation in
the value processes of the world community and its component
parts. The central demand amidst all the rising common demands
of peoples about the world today for the better clarification and
securing of human rights would appear to be that of the individual
for respect in this sense. The culminating achievement for a community that aspires to honor these demands and better to secure
human rights may be described as that of a public and civic order
in which individuals are subjected to the least possible coercion,
from either public or private sources, in the making of their
choices about participation in the community's various value processes.
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In previous studies we have explored the increasing protection
that the global community seeks to afford individuals in their
claims for a fundamental freedom of choice, for an effective equality of opportunity, and for distinctive recognition of pre-eminent
contribution to common interest.' The tremendous emphasis that
our contemporary society gives to the honoring of claims by individuals for these particular respect outcomes cannot, however, be
permitted to blind us to the fact that every claim by individuals
must be evaluated, by authoritative decision-makers and others, in
1. We have defined "respect" in these terms:
In the fundamental sense with which we are here concerned, respect is
defined as an interrelation among individual human beings in which they
reciprocally recognize and honor each others' freedom of choice about participation in the value processes of the world community or any of its component parts. Respect includes not only the perspectives or perceptions of
worth by which the individual is characterized by himself and others, but
also the translation of these perspectives into the operative facts of social
process. The relevant perspectives and operations extend to all the different
values sought in social process and to the many distinctive institutional
facilitations and deprivations by which freedom of choice is affected.
In more precise specification, respect may be said to entail four particular
outcomes:
1) a fundamental freedom of choice for all individuals regarding participation in all value processes;
2) an equality of opportunity for all individuals to have experiences that
enable them to enjoy the widest range of effective choice in their interactions with others and to participate in all value processes in accordance with
capability, that is, without discrimination for reasons irrelevant to capability;
3) additional rewards in deference to individuals who make preeminent
contribution to common interests; and
4) an aggregate pattern of social interactions in which all individuals are
protected in the utmost freedom of choice and subjected to the least possible governmental and private coercion.
McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 920-21 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as The Protection of Respect].
For further development, see McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Freedom from Discrimination in Choice of Language and InternationalHuman Rights, So. ILL. U.L.J.
151 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The Outlawing of Sexe-Based Discrimination,69 AM. J. INT'L L. 497 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Human Rights for Women]; McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen,
Non-Conforming Political Opinion and Human Rights: Transnational Protection
against Discrimination, 2 YALE STUDIES OF WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1 (1975);

McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Human Rights of the Aged: An Application of the
General Norm of Nondiscrimination, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 639 (1976); McDougal,
Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminationand World Public
Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM. J. INT'L L.
432 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Right to Religious Freedom and
World Public Order: The Emerging Norm of Nondiscrimination,74 MICH. L. REV.
865 (1976); The Protectionof Respect, supra.
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terms of the aggregate common interest.
By the aggregate common interest we refer to the greatest
shaping and widest sharing, not only of respect, but of all the values of human dignity. The promotion of aggregate common interest
requires an accommodation of the interests of any particular individual, in relation to respect or any other value, with those of
other particular individuals and with the interests of all individuals
in all other values.
The aggregate common interest need not be conceived as in
antithesis to the individual interest.2 The individual and society
need not be considered as polar opposites. The aggregate interest
may, however, be more than the sum total of particular individual
interests, since an appropriate accommodation or integration can
raise the level of value production ultimately available for all. In a
properly functioning system of public order the interests of particular individuals are harmonized in a comprehensive process of shaping and sharing values which may enhance the quality of life for all.
The aggregate common interest includes both a comprehensive public order and a civic order. It encompasses the entire domain of both public decisions, constitutive and other, and private
choices. 3 In the contemporary world of pluralistic and intimate interdependences, the aggregate common interest can be meaningfully and realistically postulated and achieved only in a mutually
supportive integration of public order and civic order. By comprehensive public order we refer to the features of the social process which, if challenged, are established and maintained by effective power, authoritative or other, through the imposition of severe
sanctions. Comprehensive public order thus includes both what we
call constitutive decisions-the decisions that establish and main2. The artificiality of the dichotomy in the individual versus society was sharply
indicated by Judge Lauterpacht:
For it is clear that the distinction between the protection of the child and

the protection of society is artificial. Both the laws relating to guardianship
and those relating to protective upbringing are laws intended primarily for
the protection of children and their interests. At the same time, the protection of children-through guardianship or protective upbringing-is preeminently in the interests of society. They are part of it-the most vulnerable and most in need of protection. All social laws are, in the last resort,
laws for the protection of individuals; all laws for the protection of individu-

als are, in a true sense, social laws.
Guardianship of Infants Convention (1902) Case, [1958] I.C.J. 55, 85.
3. Though we contrapose choices and decisions, we recognize that the difference
reflects merely a continuum in degree of severity of sanction. While decisions are
severely sanctioned, choices are sustained by moderate or no sanction.
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tain the process of authoritative decision-and the decisions which
emerge from the constitutive process to regulate the shaping and
sharing of all community values, such as wealth, enlightenment,
well-being, and so on. 4 By civic order we refer to the features of
social process that are established and maintained by recourse to
relatively mild sanctions and that afford the individual person a
maximum of autonomy, creativity and diversity in the making of
private choices, with the least possible governmental or private
coercion or interference. 5
The boundaries between comprehensive public order and civic
order exhibit a certain tension and are fluid and changing. 6 The
difference between conventional meanings that are commonly accepted in a given setting and the functional distinctions that we
adopt for purposes of valid comparison must be kept in mind. Prevailing expectations about the severity or mildness of actual or potential sanctions can be ascertained by means of contextual, empirical inquiry. It is important to note that what falls under the

conventional label of government in some jurisdictions is not
necessarily part of the public order. For instance, many community

prescriptions are not expected to be, and are not, enforcible; many
4.

See Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL, L.

REv. 362, 385-88 (1971).
5. The definition of civic order in terms both of choices maintained by mild sanction and of a maximum of autonomy in the making of private choices is designed to
be self-reinforcing. When operationally defined, civic order refers to a social process
in which choices are attended by a relatively small degree of expected or experienced deprivation (a minimum of coercion or constraint). All social interactions involve the application of indulgences and deprivations. Sanctions are the practices by
which indulgences and deprivations are applied. Institutions labelled "governmental" may or may not maintain a monopoly of severe sanctions applied in the name of
the community. Severe sanctions may in fact be applied by institutions labelled
"private". For identifying choices made in the civic order, as contrasted with decisions made in the public order, it is necessary, therefore, both to pierce institutional
labels for ascertaining functional realities and to consider the relative severity and
mildness of sanctions. Civic order choices have the dimension of mildness in sanction, whatever the source of sanction. We do not hope or expect to operate in a social
process in which choices can be free of all sanction. Autonomy connotes a wide
range of choice, but not freedom from all sanction.
6. See notes 94-95 infra and accompanying text.
In the words of Theodore Lowi:
The phrase "private life and public order" expresses two different ways of
looking at the same thing: society in its effort to provide and to survive. In
the real world it is impossible to separate private from public spheres. Analytically a distinction must be made between them, but only the better to
assess their interconnections in the real world. "Private life and public
order" is a statement of intimate relationship.
Introductionto PRIVATE LIFE AND PUBLIC ORDER at vii (T. Lowi ed. 1968).
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others involve only mild deprivations against offenders. On the
other hand, many ecclesiastical, business and other activities,
which are conventionally regarded as within the domain of civic
order, may entail severe value consequences.
A major objective of contextual analysis is to exhibit value consequences within the full range of interaction in a dynamic social
process. It is, hence, of far less consequence to draw lines in a
continuing gradation of events than to make certain that the whole
spectrum is examined. The entire continuum from public through
civic order poses significant policy problems for the maintenance of
human rights. The freedom of choice that can be maintained with
regard to any particular value process is a function both of the
character and functioning of the constitutive process and of the allocations of access to all value processes.
If appropriate respect relationships are to be achieved in the
inclusive world community, or in any component community, a
civic order must be able to interact vigorously with a public order
that performs its essential tasks. An adequate civic order is obtainable under an effectively functioning constitutive process whose
structure is compatible with human dignity values and whose output of public order decisions defend and fulfill these goals. Conversely, the scope and quality of the civic order directly affect the
constitutive process achievable and the flow of public order decisions.
For the development of these themes we propose to deal in
sequence with (A) claims relating to comprehensive public order,
and (B) claims relating to the protection of civic order. Under each
heading we will consider the factual background of problems,
relevant policies, trends in past decision, the conditions affecting
decision, and possible future alternatives.
A.

CLAIMS RELATING TO COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC ORDER

I.

FactualBackground
The claims relating to comprehensive public order are always
complementary to the claims about more particular outcomes in
relation to respect and other values. In a sense, the relevance of
comprehensive public order has already been indicated in our discussions of the various claims about particular outcomes. 7 Thus, in
various articles dealing with nondiscrimination we have noted the
7.

See note 1 supra.
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emergence of a general norm forbidding discrimination through
any group label irrelevant to individual capabilities, and our central
focus has always been upon whether or not a differentiation based
upon a particular group categorization has a reasonable basis in
relation to common interest. 8 For purposes of clarity and emphasis,
however, it may be worthwhile to reexamine the same factual settings with a more direct focus upon the aggregate common interest. The reasonableness of particular differentiations is best determined by reference to impacts upon both the comprehensive
public order and the civic order which together constitute the
whole of social process.
The specific events in social process with which we are concerned relate to incompatibilities in the demands of individuals and
groups among themselves and in reference to more general claims
on behalf of aggregate common interest. In a pluralistic society it is
inescapable that people make competitive, and sometimes incompatible, demands for different values and that the demands of individuals for particular values are upon occasion incompatible with
community security, whether that security be conceived in the
minimal sense of restraining violence and coercion or in the optimum sense of maximizing position, potential and expectancy in
the shaping and sharing of all values. The central point has been
well made by Lauterpacht:
Whatever designation of absoluteness we give to the
rights of man-whether we call them fundamental, inherent, natural, or inalienable-they cannot be absolute. For
they have a meaning only in relation to man living in society under the shelter of the political organization of the
State. Even his fundamental rights must be exercised
with due regard to the rights of others and to the safety
and the welfare of the State. Freedom of speech and opinion can be recognized and protected only if it is made use
of in a manner consistent with the law of libel and with
public peace. Personal liberty cannot be absolute. It is
subject to restraints and sanctions which the criminal law
imposes for the protection of other members of the community and the common good. Even freedom of religion
is conditioned by similar limitations. 9
8. See, e.g., Human Rights for Women, supra note 1, at 507-09.
9. H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS

OF

MAN 18384
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It is this diversity and potential for incompatibility in the demands
of individuals and groups that condition the omnipresent complementarity and ambiguity in general community prescriptions,
whether about respect or other values. In a world of scarce resources and enormous variations in value demands, identifications
and expectations, an appropriate accommodation of common interest is a continuing necessity. Despite all the realities of diversity, it is easily observable that all manner of effective working
arrangements are continuously made and maintained, through authoritative decision and otherwise, in the pursuit and furtherance
of common interest.
II.

Basic Community Policies
It is as important in relation to respect outcomes, as to other
value outcomes, to recognize the critical need for, and to make
appropriate provision for, the rational accommodation of any particular individual's rights with the comparable rights of others and
with the aggregate common interest. The necessities for such accommodation are all pervasive in social process and embrace ordinary, noncrisis as well as crisis situations, in which the aggregate
common interest is more intensely threatened.
It would not appear that new substantive policy criteria,
beyond those specified in earlier discussion, 10 are required for
guiding the necessary accommodations. The postulation of the basic
goal values of human dignity, the more general preferences inherent in this postulation about the shaping and sharing of respect and
other values, and the more general preferences about a constitutive
process which both reflects and secures human dignity values-all
these remain relevant." It should not be difficult to formulate con-

(1945) (footnote omitted).

For a detailed articulation of the necessity of accommodation, see I. BERLIN, FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969). As one author has stated: "To guarantee a liberty
is to create an unliberty. It is to tell some people that they have a choice and others
that they do not. It is to make a distinction between liberties. It is to say that some
are more important than others." Frankel, The Jurisprudence of Liberty, 46 Miss.
L.J. 561, 564 (1975). See generally Gorove, The Protection of Human Rights in Con-

stitutional Law, in

LAw IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 425 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as LAW IN THE UNITED STATES].

10.

See note 1 supra.

11. See McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principlesof Content
and Procedurefor Clarifying General Community Policies, 14
(1974); The Protectionof Respect, supra note 1, at 927-37.

VA.

J.

INT'L

L. 387
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tent principles for exploring different contexts in order to ascertain
the potential impact upon basic preferences of different options in
decision. 12 For evaluating decision options in situations of crisis,
appropriate principles of necessity and proportionality have long
been employed. 13 The underlying policy, in application of all particular principles, must of course be that of establishing a framework of community expectation and practice in which all people
enjoy and exercise the utmost freedom of choice about participation in all value processes.
Similarly, the principles of procedure recommended for the
application of any human rights prescription would appear equally
appropriate in applications that require the accommodation of
claims. It remains important to suspend judgment while exploring
all features of the context, to confront the alternative versions of
reality in the problem at hand, to pierce through the manifest
claims about facts and policies to the genuine problems which the
disinterested observer can identify, and to employ a wide range
of intellectual skills-historical, scientific, developmental and inventive-in assaying the benefits and costs to fundamental policies
of different options.14
The overall task is that of securing a flow of applications of
human rights prescriptions which best protects the rights of individuals, while simultaneously promoting the aggregate common interest. The rights that can be secured for anyone in any particular
instance are a function both of the values at stake and of many relevant conditioning factors in a dynamic context. Similarly, the importance of any particular value to the claimant and others is a
function of the ever-changing context. Although some values may
be more intensely demanded than others by community members,
there can be no absolute hierarchy of importance among different
values. What can ultimately be protected must differ from value to
12. See M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF
AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967); Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and

Procedure, 1 INQUIRY 87 (No. 2 1958); Lasswell, The Public Interest: Proposing
Principles of Content and Procedure, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 54 (Friedrich ed.
1962) [hereinafter cited as The Public Interest]; McDougal, supra note 11, at 403-04,
13. See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text. For application of the principles of necessity and proportionality in the macro-context of aggresion and selfdefense, see M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 121-260 (1961).
14. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & J. MILLER, supra note 12, at 65-77,
270-359; McDougal, supra note 11, at 404-05.
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value, from problem to problem even in the same value process,
and from context to context. The most important policy concern, as
we have indicated elsewhere, must be that of developing a contextual method that effectively employs adequate principles of content
and procedure both to facilitate close scrutiny of all the pertinent
variables and to evaluate the consequences of alternative decisions. 15
It may require especial vigilance to insure that the claim to
integrate a common interest is not abused. Power elites notoriously
often confuse their special interests in power and other values with
the common interest of the community as a whole. It cannot be
denied that the interests of the global community and of its component communities are often not fully realized in fact and that
what is proffered as common interest is sometimes spurious.
Nonetheless, the urgent need for improving the harmony of particular interests in the aggregate of protected interests can not rationally be denied or neglected.
III. Trends in Decision
The human rights prescriptions which affect respect, like the
demands they express and protect in a pluralistic society, are both
complementary in form (in terms of the rights protected) and
highly abstract in their particular formulations. 16 Fortunately,
many prescriptions have explicitly recognized the necessity for accommodating particular interests with aggregate common interest
in both ordinary and crisis situations. This recognition appears both
in broad, general provisions and in the specification of particular
values.
It would appear to make little difference in what form provision for accommodation is made, or that all provisions are repetitious and cumulative in effect. Since accommodation always requires connecting particular claims in reference to different values
in contexts of expanding impact and interdependence, we conclude
15. See note 12 supra; The Protection of Respect, supra note 1, at 929-31.
16. See McDougal, supra note 11, at 390. For a detailed development of the complementarity in legal principle in correspondence to complementarity in social process, see McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority: The Balanced
Opposites of a Legal System, in THE ETHIC OF POWER: THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITICS 221 (H. Lasswell & H. Cleveland eds. 1962). See
also M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 165-68 (1931); Cardozo, The Paradoxes of
Legal Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOzO 251, 252-70

(M. Hall ed. 1947).
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that accommodations can rationally be made only in terms of the
largest context and of impacts upon all values. Therefore, provisions that require the accommodation of any particular value outcome with other outcomes and with the aggregate common interest
must of necessity go beyond any single value process and refer to
all interacting processes in the larger community. Certainly, since
the value "respect" is defined in terms of freedom of access to all
values, 17 both the general provisions for accommodation which
make explicit reference to many different values and the more particular provisions which focus primarily upon the necessities of accommodation in relation to some particular value inevitably affect
the shaping and sharing of respect.
In brief exploration of how respect outcomes may be affected,
it will be convenient to note, first, provisions for the accommodation of particular human rights with other human rights and the
aggregate common interest, and, second, provisions for permissible
derogations from some human rights in times of high crisis and
intense threat to general community interest.
The explicit recognition of the necessity for rational accommodation, even in noncrisis situations, is admirably indicated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After spelling out in serial
detail the more important rights of the individual in its first
twenty-seven Articles, the Universal Declaration concludes by devoting its last three Articles-28, 29, and 30-to expression of the
kind of aggregate concern we recommend.
The overriding importance of the aggregate common interest
is projected, in Article 28, in the most comprehensive terms:
Everyone is entitled to a social and international
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized.' 8
This brief provision but reflects the widely held view that, in the
contemporary world of global interdependences, the human rights
of the individual can be made meaningful and secure only by reference to the most inclusive context.
The inherent components of a comprehensive public order are
articulated in Article 29:

17.
18.

See note 1 supra.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, art. 28,

G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, 76 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal
Declaration].
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1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
the free and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined
by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations. 19
The provision that "everyone has duties to the community" is an
indication of the relativity of the rights to be accorded to the individual; rights and duties are, indeed, regarded as two sides of the
same coin. The equal emphasis upon rights and duties is made
even more pronounced in the American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man, which is divided into two chapters: the first
dealing with "Rights," and the second with "Duties." 2 0 Paragraph 2
of Article 29 is a key provision in its insistence that there is a
comprehensive public order in which appropriate particular accommodations of conflicting claims are to be made. It provides a
broad framework within which any one particular value outcome is
to be reconciled with all other relevant value outcomes, aggregate
or particular, in an ever-changing community context.
Exemplifying its concern for accomodations which do not unnecessarily deprive the rights of individuals, the Universal Declaration, in Article 30, provides a final safeguard and reminder:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
21
herein.
19. Id. art. 29, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 76-77.
20. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Resolution XXX,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogota,
Columbia, 30 Mar.-2 May 1948 [hereinafter cited as American Declaration], Pan
American Union, Final Act of the Ninth Conference of American States 38-45 (1948),

reprinted in
RIGHTS 187
DOCUMENTS].

BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL

PROTECTION OF HUMAN

(L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as

21. Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art 30, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 77.

BASIC
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In a complex world in which the rights of the individual can be
affected by so many actors, official and other, in so many different
ways, Article 30 serves as a significant admonition. Its message is
simple and clear: the rights and freedoms protected are not to be
diluted or destroyed under any pretext, even in the name of
22
accommodation.
This safeguarding theme, so manifest in the Universal Declaration, is reiterated in both Covenants on Human Rights. Thus, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in Article 5,
provides:
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted
as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for in the present Covenant.
2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from
any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant
to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext
that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights
23
or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, in Article 4, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the
State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State
may subject such rights only to such limitations as are
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic
society.

22.

See

24

N. ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS 143

(1958).
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,

art. 5, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 53, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
24. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 50, U.N.
Doe. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Economic Rights].
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Article 5 further states:
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted
as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized
herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for in the present Covenant.
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any
country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes
25
them to a lesser extent.
This same theme is given further expression in the regional
human rights prescriptions. The European Convention on Human
Rights states in Article 17:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
26
provided for in the Convention.
Article 18 of the European Convention further stipulates:
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to
the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any
purpose other than those for which they have been
27
prescribed.
The provisions in the American Convention on Human Rights
are even more elaborate. Article 29 reads:
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
25.

Id. art. 5, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.

26. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
adopted Nov. 4, 1950, art. 17, [1950] Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 234
[hereinafter cited as European Convention].
27. Id. art. 18, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234. The case law and problems relating to accommodations and derogations in the context of the European Convention of Human
Rights are offered in EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, CASE-LAW
Topics, No. 4: "HuMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS" (1973) [hereinafter cited
as "HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS"].
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(a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to
suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights
and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to
restrict them to a greater extent than is provided
for herein;
(b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right
or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of
any State Party or by virtue of another convention
to which one of the said states is a party;
(c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from
representative democracy as a form of government; or
(d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and
other international acts of the same nature may
2
have. s
Article 30 provides:
The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention,
may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of the rights
or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except
in accordance with laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such
29
restrictions have been established.
And Article 32 states:
1. Every person has responsibilities to his family, his
community, and mankind.
2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of
others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of
30
the general welfare, in a democratic society.
In addition to all these general provisions about accommodation, there are a host of more particular prescriptions, in relation to
28. American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, art. 29, O.A.S.
Official Records OEA/Ser.KIXVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 99, 110 (1970) [hereinafter cited as American
Convention].
29. Id. art. 30, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 110.
30. Id. art. 32, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 110.
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specific values, which affect the shaping and sharing of respect.
Provisions which make explicit reference to respect itself, even in
the more limited sense of "privacy," are infrequent. One example
is found in the European Convention on Human Rights, which
provides in Article 8:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. 3 1
An excellent example of a particular provision in relation to
another value which must affect respect, in its broadest sense, is
found in the prescriptions concerning freedom of association. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in Article 22,
provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this
right other than those which are prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order
(ordrepublic), the protection of public health or morals or
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This
Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in
their exercise of this right.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to
the International Labour Organization Convention of 1948
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize to take legislative measures which
would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as
31.

European Convention, supra note 26, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
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to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Con2
vention.3
Comparable provisions are found in Article 11 of the European
Convention on Human Rights 33 and Article 16 of the American
34
Convention on Human Rights.
Other particular provisions for accommodation, which inevitably affect respect, abound. The list includes:
(1) in relation to power: Articles 12(3), 13, 14(1) and 21 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (regarding
freedom of movement and residence, freedom from expulsion, " a
fair and public hearing," and freedom of assembly);3 5 Articles 5(1),
6 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (concerning "the right to liberty and security of person," "a fair and public
hearing," and freedom of assembly);3 6 Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol of the European Convention (regarding freedom of movement
and residence); 37 and Articles 15 and 22 of the American Conven32. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 22, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
33. Article 11 states:
1. Everyone has the right to . . . freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his

interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society

in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restriction on the exercise of these rights by members of
the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
European Convention, supra note 26, art. 11, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
34. Article 16 provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labour, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.
2. Exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions established by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public order, or to protect public health or
morals or the rights and freedoms of others.
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition of legal restrictions, including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of association,
on members of the armed forces and the police.
American Convention, supra note 28, art. 16, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 106.
35. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, arts. 12(3), 13, 14(1)
and 21, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 54-55.
36. European Convention, supra note 26, arts. 5(1), 6 and 11, 213 U.N.T.S. at
226-32.
37. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
COLLECTED TEXTS 44 (11th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTED TEXTS].
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tion on Human Rights (concerning freedom of assembly and free38
dom of movement and residence);
(2) in relation to enlightenment: Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (regarding freedom of
expression);3 9 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (regarding freedom of expression);40 and Article 13 of the
American Convention on Human Rights (concerning freedom of
41
expression);
(3) in relation to wealth: Article I of the First Protocol of the
European Convention on Human Rights (regarding the right to
property)4 2 and Article 21 of the American Convention on Human
43
Rights (regarding the right to property);
(4) in relation to rectitude: Article 18(3) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (regarding "freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs");44 Article 9(2) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (regarding "[f]reedom to manifest
one's religion or beliefs");45 and Article 12(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights (regarding "[f]reedom to manifest one's
46
religion and beliefs").
Provisions that authorize derogations from particular rights in
times of high crisis, and which in consequence may affect the shaping and sharing of respect, are also found in all the major human
rights conventions. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in Article 4, provides:
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of
the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to the present Covenant may
38. American Convention, supra note 28, arts. 15 and 22, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 106-08.

39. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 19(3), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
40. European Convention, supra note 26, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
41. American Convention, supra note 28, art. 13, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at

105-06.
42. European Convention, supra note 26, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed Mar. 20, 1952, in
European Convention, protocol no. 1, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 262.
43.

American Convention, supra note 28, art. 21, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

at 107.
44. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 18(3), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
45. European Convention, supra note 26, art. 9(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
46. American Convention, supra note 28, art. 12(3), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

at 105.
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take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures
are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on
the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and
2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself
of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the
other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the provisions from which it has derogated and of
the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the same intermediary on
47
the date on which it terminates such derogation.
The wording of the European Convention on Human Rights differs
slightly. Article 15(1) reads:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening
the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take
measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 4 8
The American Convention on Human Rights, similarly, contains a
derogation clause in Article 27, which reads in part:
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency
that threatens the independence or security of a State
Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for
the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law
47. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 4, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) at 53.
48. European Convention, supra note 26, art. 15(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
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and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race,
49
color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
It will be noted that these prescriptions impose requirements of
necessity and proportionality, the ascertainment of which must entail examination of very large factual contexts. 50
It will be observed that all the prescriptions outlined above,
whether providing for accommodation or authorizing derogation,
have exhibited remarkable uniformity both in their emphasis upon
aggregate common interest and in their itemization of particular
important policies. The recurring terms of reference, in quick inventory, include: "meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society;". "national
security;" ".publicsafety;" "public order (ordre public);" "the protection of public health;" "morals;" "the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others;" "for the prevention of disorder or crime;"
"the rights of others;" "the security of all;" "the just demands of
the general welfare;" "in a democratic society;" "the economic
well-being of the country;" .compelling reasons of national security;" "the interests of justice;" "the interest of juvenile persons;"
49.

American Convention, supra note 28, art. 27, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

at 109.
50. It may be observed that the intellectual difficulties in problems of accommodation and derogation are much the same, with the latter distinguishable only by the
additional fact of alleged community crisis. For general discussion of the complexities of the problems of derogation and accommodation, see F. CASTBERG, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 165-70 (T. Opsahl & T. Ouchterlony
eds. 1974); A. DEL Russo, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 123-28,
155-59 (1971); J. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS 245-50 (1969); F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 195-214 (1975); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 112-39 (1963);

Becket, The Greek Case before the European Human Rights Commission, 1 HUMAN
RIGHTS 91 (1970); Buergenthal, Proceedings against Greece under the European
Convention of Human Rights, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 441 (1968); Coleman, Greece and
the Council of Europe: The InternationalLegal Protection of Human Rights by the
Political Process, 2 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (1972); Daes, Restrictions and
Limitations on Human Rights, in INT'L INST. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 3 RENE CASSIN
AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER 79 (1971); LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 9; Lawless v. Ireland (Merits), 4 Y.B. EuR. CON. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438

(1961); Morrison, Margin of Appreciation in Human Rights Law, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS
J. 263 (1973); Schwelb, Some Aspects of the InternationalCovenants on Human
Rights of December 1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103,

114-17 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968); Smith, The European Convention on Human
Rights and the Right of Derogation: A Solution to the Problem of Domestic
Jurisdiction,11 How. L.J. 594 (1965); Van Boven, Some Remarks on Special Problems Relating to Human Rights in Developing Countries, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 383,
391-92 (1970).
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"public interest;" and "the public interest in a democratic society."
What has been conspicuously missing from this rich body of
prescriptive statement has been detailed specification of the principles of application, especially of procedure, which might be
employed to increase the possibility of making rational accommodations and derogations. Exhortations to secure the balanced protection of all values and to take aggregate common interest into account can scarcely be made effective without the specification of
principles, at lower levels of abstraction, designed to facilitate the
exploration of factual contexts and the assessment of the value benefits and costs of available options.
It is not adequate discharge of this particular intellectual responsibility to emphasize, as many of the prescriptions do, the importance of due process of law, in the sense that decisions about
accommodation be taken in accordance with the law ("in accordance with the law," "determined by law," "prescribed by law,"
"in conformity with law"). This requirement for conformity with
the law is of course designed to insure that decisions are taken
within structures of authority and to minimize elements of arbitrariness in the course of decision. 5 1 The requirement of recourse to
authoritative structures for decision, though necessary, is no effec52
tive substitute for the provision of appropriate intellectual tools.
It is remarkable that even the literature of human rights has made
so little contribution to the development of useful principles of application, either of content or of procedure.
B.

CLAIms RELATING TO CIVIC ORDER (INCLUDING PRIVACY)

I.

FactualBackground
By civic order, as previously indicated, we refer to the features of social process that are cultivated and sustained by recourse
to relatively mild rather than severe sanctions. 53 It is the domain of
social process in which the individual person is freest from coercion, governmental or other, and in which a high degree of individual autonomy and creativity prevails. Civic order thus includes
all of the processes and institutions of private choice, as distinguished from public decision. 54 The core reference of civic order
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Daes, supra note 50, at 82-86.
See notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
See note 3 supra.
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is, it may be reiterated, to freedom of choice for participation in
each of the value processes. However, in contrast with the claims
of particular individuals for a "fundamental freedom of choice in
value participation," the claims with which we dealt under the first
outcome of respect, 55 the focus here is upon a freedom of choice
not involving immediate and particular public decision; our concern is for the larger flow of decision protecting aggregate patterns
of freedom of choice for all individuals and groups. The distinctive
reference of civic order is to the totality of freedom of choice
achieved or achievable in a community.
Civic order, as we define it, includes "privacy," but we give a
more limited reference to privacy. The term "privacy" is, in much
contemporary usage, accorded a wide range of reference. 56 Sometimes it is employed as a functional equivalent to the "right to be
let alone," with practically the same broad reference that we impute to civic order. 57 It appears more appropriate, however, to
55. See The Protection of Respect, supra note 1, at 937-1034.
56. Arthur R. Miller observes:
The concept of privacy is difficult to define because it is exasperatingly
vague and evanescent, often meaning strikingly different things to different
people. In part this is because privacy is a notion that is emotional in its
appeal and embraces a multitude of different "rights," some of which are
intertwined, others often seemingly unrelated or inconsistent.
A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS
25 (1971) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Dixon has stated: "Few concepts . . .are
more vague or less amenable to definition and structural treatment than privacy."
Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitution Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197, 199 (1965).
On the diversity of the concept of privacy, see Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27
RUT. L. REV. 275 (1974). In addition to notes 58, 144, 169, 184, and 223 infra, see
also REPORT OF THE COMMTTEE ON PRIVACY, CMND. No. 5012, at 17-22, 327-28
(Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as THE YOUNGER REPORT]; CAN. DEP'T OF
COM./DEP'T OF JUST., TASK FORCE, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS 12-14 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS]; M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ,
PRIVACY: THE RIGHT To BE LET ALONE (1962); H. GROSS, PRIVACY-ITS LEGAL
PROTECTION (1964); PRIVACY (NOMOS XIII, J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971);
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH (1967); Christie, The Right to Privacy and The Freedom to Know: A

Comment on Professor Miller's The Assault on Privacy, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 970
(1971); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34 (1967); Lusky, Invasion
of Privacy: A Clarificationof Concepts, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 693 (1972); Reubhausen
& Brim, Jr., Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1184 (1965); Shils,
Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 281 (1966);
Simmel, Privacy, 12 INT'L ENCYC. SOC. SCI. 480 (1968); Symposium, 4 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1972); Symposium-Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
251 (1966); Wagner, The Right of Privacy and its Limitations in the U.S.A., in LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

491 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1974).
57. The origin of the expression, "The right to be let alone," is attributed to Judge
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restrict the reference of privacy to freedom of the individual in
terms of the information that can be acquired and communicated
by, and to, others about him. 58 So defined, the concept serves as
an important component of the more comprehensive freedoms encompassed within a properly functioning civic order. Such restrictive usage may help to bring relevant policy considerations into
sharper focus and to facilitate the contextual analysis essential to
decision-making.
The aggregate patterns of civic order are of course comprised
of the particular assertions of fundamental freedoms of choice by
individuals in the different value processes. It may be recalled that
we described these fundamental freedoms, in relation to values
other than power, as follows:
in relation to enlightenment, the freedom to acquire, use,
and communicate knowledge; in relation to well-being,
the freedom to develop and maintain psychosomatic integrity and a healthy personality; in relation to wealth,
freedom of contract and of access to goods and services; in
relation to skill, the freedom to discover, mature, and exercise latent talents; in relation to affection, the freedom
to establish and enjoy congenial personal relationships;
and in relation to rectitude, freedom to form, maintain,
and express norms of responsible conduct."9
From a global perspective, the achievement of a comprehensive civic order, in which the aggregate pattern of social interaction
affords all individuals and groups a fundamental freedom of choice
in the shaping and sharing of all values, is more aspiration than
reality. In an interdependent yet divided world in which demands
for the unity of humankind interplay with the practices of parochial
Cooley. T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). See notes 129-223 infra
and accompanying text.
58. Such a restrictive reference is offered by Westin: "Privacy is the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others." A. WEsT1N,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1968). Similarly, Arthur Miller writes: "[Tihe basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual's ability to control the circulation of information relating to him-a power that often is essential to maintaining
social relationships and personal freedom." A. MILLER, supra note 56, at 25. In the
words of Fried: "Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the
minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves."
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
59. The Protection of Respect, supra note 1, at 940.
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fragmentation, continuing expectations of violence, external as well
as internal, are widely shared by the elite and the rank and file
alike. 60 Under "a global war system,"'6 1 threats of violence and
preparations for defense have generated "a pervasive anxiety for
personal and group security," 62 culminating in "a constant process
of mobilization of the population under the supervision63 of security
experts, anxiety managers, and specialists in violence."
In many communities, under perpetual apprehension of violence, power considerations, as measured by aggregate fighting potential, inevitably predominate. The overriding goal of maintaining
national security in the sense of freedom from external coercion
and dictation necessitates the continuing appraisal and reappraisal
of all social values and institutional practices with state-power considerations in view. Wealth values and institutions are drawn into
the task of national defense and mobilization and are hence subordinated to power. Scientific skill and education are requisitioned
for research and development. Public enlightenment is curtailed or
distorted in the name of national security and defense secrecy.
Public health programs are regimented in such a way as to conserve the human resources that figure in military potential. Affection and ecclesiastical institutions and practices are condoned only
insofar as they interpose no ideological or behavioral obstacles to
national security. Institutions and practices of social class and caste
are modified and restructured to the extent that national vulnerability is believed to be at stake.
Because of obsession with the real or imagined needs of national security, resources are diverted to large-scale arms and other
defense programs. Consequently, the scope of government in politics, in industry and business, in science and education, in public
60. See generally R.
WAR SYSTEM

(1965); R.

(1972); B.

COCHRAN, THE

FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD

(1968); R. FALK,

BARNET, THE ROOTS OF WAR

THIS ENDANGERED PLANET (1971); H. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL
INSECURITY (1965 ed.); LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore ed.

1974); R. NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 146-93 (1975); 3 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971); Lasswell, The Garrison State Hypothesis Today, in CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY POLITICS 51 (S.
Huntington ed. 1962); Lasswell, The GarrisonState and Specialists on Violence, in

H. LASSWELL, THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 146 (1948).

61.

Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, in

LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 252 (J. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter

cited as Reisman]; Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to
Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
62. Reisman, supra note 61, at 263.
63. Id. at 264.
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health, and in every other sector of life has immensely expanded.
Many functions and activities, traditionally civic in nature, are
either taken over or regimented by government, with its everburgeoning bureaucratic machinery. Expanded government leads
to more centralized government, with greater concentration of
power and resources in the central (federal) government, especially
in a few hands in the executive branch.64
The degree of regimentation, governmentalization, centralization and concentration differs of course from community to community. In a totalitarian polity committed to a totalitarian ideology,
society is practically subordinated to government and swallowed up
by government.6 5 Power, which is regarded as all pervasive and
omni-competent, tolerates little challenge. Politicization of civic activities is the catchword. "Big Brother," not the acting individual person, decides and directs. The traditional realms of private
choice are extravagantly encroached upon by government. For
countries preoccupied with the critical task of nation-building
and modernization, in a world of contending ideologies, dynamic
change and insecurity, government is generally the most impor66
tant, indeed the only, sector capable of undertaking this task.
Hence, the syndromes of governmentalization, regimentation, centralization and concentration have vigorously manifested themselves. Today, even the older liberal democratic polities are not
immune from these syndromes, as they are plagued, only in lesser
degree, by the chronic expectations of violence and by the complex
problems of "the welfare state" and of "interdependence amid
scarcity. "67
Encroachments upon a properly functioning civic order come,
increasingly, also from nongovernmental sources. Private parties
may coerce through naked power and with regard to all values.
64. See M. CROZIER, S. HUNTINGTON, & J. WATANUKI, THE CmsIs OF DEMoCRACY (1975); Miller, Privacy in the Corporate State: A Constitutional Value of

Dwindling Significance, 22 J. PUB. L. 3 (1973).
65. "The very essence of a totalitarian society," in the words of a recent Canadian

governmental report on privacy, "is that it penetrates and intrudes into these realms
[of civic order]-with nearly perfect totality in Orwell's 1984." PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, supra note 56, at 12.

66. See L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, FORMOSA, CHINA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS
322-32 (1967); M. JANOWITZ, THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF NEW NATIONS (1964); THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UNDERDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES (J. Johnson ed. 1962).
67. Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and
Proposals,84 YALE L.J. 969, 998 (1975).
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The dramatic potentialities in private coercion are well-illustrated
in the contemporary practices of terrorism. 68 As the world community becomes a global village equipped with instantaneous communication, it is possible to focus world-wide attention simultaneously on a single spectacular event. In consequence, the terror
practiced by individuals and small groups generates impact far
69
beyond the locality in which a particular incident occurs.
Increasing threats to civic order are today most dramatically
manifested in regard to privacy. This is a consequence both of the
spectacular developments of modern science and technology that
are capable of penetrating the traditional zones of privacy and of
the intensity with which certain demands to invade privacy are
propagated by governmental and private sectors alike. 70 The modalities of encroachment, as Alan Westin conveniently summarizes
71
in his outstanding study, are threefold: (1) "physical surveillance,"72 and (3) "data surveillance.- 73
(2) "psychological surveillance,"
Physical surveillance involves "the observation through optical
or acoustical devices of a person's location, acts, speech, or private
writing without his knowledge or against his will." 7 4 Such surveillance, clandestine in nature, may be carried out by a host of
devices, including telephone tapping, concealed microphones of
various kinds (magnetic, contact, laser, miniature, and so on, and

68. See generally INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY (D. Carlton
& C. Schaerf eds. 1975); Franck & Lockwood, Preliminary Thoughts Towards an
InternationalConvention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1974); Measures to
Prevent International Terrorism, Study by the Secretariat, U.N. Doe. A/C.6/418
(1972); Meron, Some Legal Aspects of Arab Terrorists' Claims to Privileged
Combatancy, 40 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 47 (1970); Rovine,

The Contemporary International Legal Attack on Terrorism, 3 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN
RIlrrs 9 (1973). See also Abu-Lughod, Unconventional Violence and International
Politics, 67 Am. J. INT'L L. 100-04 (1973); Dugard, Towards the Definition of International Terrorism, id. at 94-100; Moore, Toward Legal Restraints on International Terrorism, id. at 88-94.
69. Witness, for example, the Black September at the 1972 Olympic games in
Munich. The details are discussed in C. DOBSON, BLACK SEPTEMBER (1974). See

also The Economist, Sept. 9, 1972, at 31-34; Newsweek, Sept. 18, 1972, at 24-35;
Time, Sept. 18, 1972, at 22-33; N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1972, at 1, col. 8; Washington
Post, Sept. 6, 1972, at 1, col. 7.
70. For an early detection of this trend long before the contemporary burgeoning
of books and articles, see Lasswell, The Threat to Privacy, in CONFLICT OF
LOYALTIES 121 (R. Maclver ed. 1952).

71.
72.
73.
74.

A. WESTIN, supra note 58, at 68-69, 90.
Id. at 68, 133.
Id. at 68, 158.
Id. at 68.
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microphone bullets), miniature transmitters, miniaturized and transistorized tape recorders, ultrared photography, hidden cameras,
closed-circuit television, one-way glass, long-distance lenses and
75
informer infiltration.
Psychological surveillance includes the use of drugs or hypnosis, singly or in combination, to induce revelation of a person's
entire life history including intimate details, as well as the use of
the polygraph (lie detection), personality testing (oral or written)
and various other methods of enforced disclosure which extract information without knowledge or genuine informed consent of the
76
individual concerned.
Data surveillance, as a result of the advent of electronic dataprocessing (primarily through the computer) and the rapid and
wide application of this new technology by both governmental and
non-governmental sectors, has moved from the manual to the electronic age, from decentralization and fragmentation to centralization and concentration. 7 7 In a data-rich civilization, as symbolized

75. For more details, see M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); R.
BROWN, THE ELECTRONIC INVASION (1967); S. DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959);
M. MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY (1972); V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964);
UNCLE SAM IS WATCHING YOU (H. Barth ed. 1971); A. WESTIN, supra note 58, at
69-132; Donner, Political Intelligence: Cameras, Informers and Files, in PRIVACY IN
A FREE SOCIETY 56 (Final Report-Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on
Advocacy in the United States, 1974); Jones, Some Threats of Technology to Privacy,
in PRIVACY AND HuMAN RIGHTS 139-56 (A. Robertson ed. 1973); Juvigny, Modern

Scientific and Technical Developments and Their Consequences on the Protection
of the Right to Respect for a Person's Private and Family Life, His Home and
Communications, in id. at 132-35; Lasswell, supra note 70; Pyle, Spies Without Masters: The Army Still Watches Civilian Politics, 1 CIV. LIB. REV. 38 (Summer 1974);

Schwartz, Six Years of Tapping and Bugging, id. at 26; Shattuck, Tilting at the Surveillance Apparatus, id. at 59.
76. See M. BRENTON, supra note 75, at 91-116; L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (2d ed. 1961); F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND

CRIMn AL INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953); A. WESTIN, supra note 58, at 133-57; Dession, et al., Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315
(1953); Jones, supra note 75, at 156-60; Juvigny, supra note 75, at 137-38; Lasswell,
supra note 70, at 125-26.
77. As Miller points out:
Until recently, informational privacy has been relatively easy to protect:
(1) large quantities of information about individuals traditionally have not
been collected and therefore have not been available to others; (2) the available information generally has been maintained on a decentralized basis and
typically has been widely scattered; (3) the available information has been
relatively superficial in character and often has been allowed to atrophy to
the point of uselessness; (4) access to the available information has not been
easy to secure; (5) people in a highly mobile society have been difficult to
keep track of; and (6) most people have been unable to interpret and infer
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by the mushrooming data banks, the enormous capacities (in
speed, volume, and efficiency) of modem technology to gather,
store, retrieve, process, and disseminate information have led to
the information explosion, pregnant with menacing threats to informational privacy of individuals and groups. Under the onslaught
of the escalating spiral of data-gathering, dossier-building and
record-keeping, the individual finds himself steadily losing control
over personal information."
revealing information from the available data.
A. MILLER, supra note 56, at 26. As a consequence of the "combination of greater
social planning and computer capacity," "many governmental agencies are beginning
to ask increasingly complex, probing, and sensitive questions." Id. at 21.
Characterizing the developing computer technology in terms of "digital representation," "mass storage devices," and "on-line, multi-access systems," Niblett stresses:
These modem systems constitute a vast communication network for digital
information in which the central storage devices can be interrogated and the
data processed with imperceptible delays from many remote stations. By
'on-line' is meant that communication is direct from the central processor to
peripheral equipment such as teletype consoles and visual display screens.
The systems operate in 'real time'-that is to say, the result of a processing
operation is available instantly or on a time scale short by comparison with
the process it is controlling or monitoring. The term "multi-access" indicates
that the computer is available simultaneously to many users, who may be at
terminals remote from the computer itself.
Niblett, Computers and Privacy, in PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167, 169-70 (A.
Robertson ed. 1973). Today, computers are employed to store not only "scientific or
numerical information, or information already in the public domain," but, increasingly, sensitive information about one's personal life. Id. at 170-71. Such information,
Niblett adds, "is increasingly being fed into the memories of computers and much of
it can now be recorded and updated as it is created; we are approaching the on-line
society in which our records are generated and maintained 'on line."'
78. See Computer Privacy, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Ad. Prac. and Proc.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 14-15, 1967); The
Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy, of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (July
26-28, 1966); RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973) (Report
of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S.
Department of Health, Education & Welfare); E. ENGBERG, THE SPY IN THE
CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (1967); P. HAMILTON,
ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1967); A. HARRISON, THE
PROBLEM OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1970); E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS: THE INVASION OF PRIVACY BY GOVERNMENT AND

INDUSTRY (1966); A. MILLER, supra note 56; ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN
AMERICAN LIFE (S. Wheeler ed. 1970); PRIVACY, -COMPUTERS, AND You (B. Rowe
ed. 1972); J. ROSENBERG, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969); J. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES
AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE (1974); SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS

(L. Hoffman ed. 1973); A. WESTIN, supra note 58, at 158-68; A. WESTIN & M. BAKER,
DATABANKS

IN A FREE SOCIETY:

COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING

AND PRIVACY

(1972); Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211
(1963); INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY (A. Westin ed. 1971); Lass-

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

As knowledge and technique for invading privacy increase, so
also do demands for encroaching upon the privacy of individuals
and groups, whether for legitimate reasons or otherwise. The
threats and assaults come from the private sector as well as the
public. They come from actors with and without malice. "Datamania" takes on a life of its own and keeps growing. 79 The damage
that the clandestine surveillances can do is manifold and farreaching. Thus, a report by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations summarizes:
Wholesale invasions of privacy inhibit liberty, often purposely. This is particularly true of surreptitious invasions,
like electronic eavesdropping, spies, informers, entrappers, and psychological testing, the existence of which
the subject is often unaware until too late. The community becomes fear-ridden, and no one can be trusted,
whether he be family, friend or associate; indeed, a person may be led to continual distrust of himself, as his efforts at individual self-fulfilment conflict with the norms of
authority. This destruction of trust is one of the major
dangers to a free society. A pervasive mistrust of others
impairs freedom of assembly, for men fearful of spies and
well, Policy Problems of a Data-Rich Civilization, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN

A DEMOCRACY, supra, at 187-97; Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The
Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 1089 (1969); Miller, The Right to Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, in
PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 75, at 72-85; Weisner, The Information
Revolution-and the Bill of Rights, 5 LAw AND COMPUTER TECH. 40 (No. 2 March-

April 1972).
Thus, as Peter Drucker reminds us, "There is a great deal more to information and
data processing than the computer; the computer is to the information industry
roughly what the central power station is to the electrical industry." P. DRUCKER,
THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY 24 (1968).

In underscoring the threats posed by contemporary technological developments,
we do not seek to minimize the constructive contribution of science-based technology to social process. The more positive contribution is described by Juvigny:
It is easy to understand the fascination which the possible use of computers
in government departments exercises on organisation and methods chiefs. In
the collecting and interpreting of information, in programming, in decision-making, in improving the registration of births, marriages and deaths, in
conscription, in police records, in the administration of revenue departments, staff, equipment stocks and the like, or in general or sector planning,
the use of computers appears to make it possible both to run public services
economically and to increase their means of action and the effectiveness of
their programmes.
Juvigny, supra note 75, at 135.
79. As Arthur Miller has stated: "The new information technologies seem to have
given birth to a new social virus-'data-mania.' " A. MILLER, supra note 56, at 22.
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informers, human or mechanical, are loath to join together meaningfully. And a man's awareness that others
lack faith in him seriously weakens his chance for selffulfilment, for few men can develop adequately without
the confidence of others. Thus, the detailed questionnaire
for employment, housing, insurance and other matters,
the hidden but suspected cameras in the washroom, the
psychological tests, the lie detector and truth serum-all
of these devices for ferreting out intimate and often unconscious details of our lives, produce a pervasive insecurity which suppresses individuality, discourages responsibility and encourages frightened conformity .... *80
II.

Basic Community Policies
Our postulated goal of human dignity favors the widest possible freedom of choice and, hence, the fewest possible coerced
choices for the individual, whether acting singly or through groups.
The projected ideal is toward a social context in which "choices"
rather than "decisions" are cultivated on the largest possible scale,
thereby reducing occasions for coercion to an inescapable minimum. 8 1 This is in keeping with the liberal tradition that seeks to
minimize the politicization or governmentalization of social interactions and to maintain institutional processes compatible with
human dignity values. In the words of Westin:
Liberal democratic theory assumes that a good life for the
individual must have substantial areas of interest apart
from political participation-time devoted to sports, arts,
literature, and similar non-political pursuits. These areas
of individual pursuit prevent the total politicizing of life
and permit other models of success and happiness to
serve as alternatives to the political career and the citi82
zenship role.

80. Respect for the Privacy of Individuals, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.411116 (1973) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Report on Privacy].
The constellation of practices that have become known as "Watergate" of course
represent the epitome of combined governmental and private invasions of civic
order. For the various techniques in political surveillance and the problems they
raise, see 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER, AND
DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIviL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 183-201 (4th Law
School ed. 1976).
81. See note 3 supra.
82. A. WESTIN, supra note 58, at 24.
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In more fundamental conception, he elaborates further:
In democratic societies there is a fundamental belief in
the uniqueness of the individual, in his basic dignity and
worth as a creature of God and a human being, and in the
need to maintain social processes that safeguard his sacred
individuality. Psychologists and sociologists have linked
the development and maintenance of this sense of individuality to the human need for autonomy-the desire to
83
avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly by others.
A properly functioning civic order which affords adequate protection of a large zone of personal autonomy is thus crucial for
ample fulfillment of the individual and for innovation and rich diversity in community life. Personal autonomy thrives when privacy
is respected. Creativity flourishes in a social environment in which
voluntary participation in the life of society is affirmed and individuals are left free either to induce one another to engage in the
production and accumulation of one value rather than another or to
enjoy a particular value rather than to accumulate it further.
The right to privacy, in the restricted sense in which we have
defined it,8 4 is demonstrably indispensable to a meaningful civic
order. Without substantial control over the flow of information
about the private self, autonomy in an individual's personal life and
private choices is unattainable. The ideal of civic order requires the
least possible interference, by officials and nonofficials alike, with
individual choice. 8 5 Such a civic order is unthinkable if the individual is under constant surveillance and indiscriminately laid bare
in all matters. In summation of these interrelations, one of the authors some years ago wrote: "Respect is the deference that we give
and deserve in our capacity as human beings, and on the basis of
our individual merit. The presumption in favor of privacy follows
from our respect for freedom of choice, for autonomy, for selfdirection on the part of everyone." 86 Similarly, Clinton Rossiter
has written:
83. Id. at 33.
84. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text.
86. Lasswell, supra note 70, at 134. For a derivational relation between privacy
and affection, and philosophical grounds for the protection of privacy, see Fried,
note 58 supra. Fried emphasizes that privacy is not "just a defensive right;" it
"forms the necessary context for the intimate relations of love and friendship." Id. at
490. He adds:
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Privacy is a special kind of independence, which can be
understood as an attempt to secure autonomy in at least a
few personal and spiritual concerns, if necessary in defiance of all the pressures of modem society. It is an attempt, that is to say, to do more than maintain a posture
of self-respecting independence toward other men; it
seeks to erect an unbreachable wall of dignity and reserve
against the entire world. The free man is the private man,
the man who still keeps some of his thoughts and judgments entirely to himself, who feels no overriding compulsion to share everything of value with others, not even
87
with those he loves and trusts.
A critical function of the civic order is to foster an environment in which people can indulge in a wide range of spontaneous
cultural expressions, experimentations and innovations in ways
compatible with the aggregate common interest. A rich culture and
civic order intimately interact and reinforce each other. Culture
flourishes when the civic order is vigorous and individuals and
groups enjoy a high degree of autonomy and fulfillment in the
shaping and sharing of all values. An enriched culture provides the
matrix in which spontaneity, creativity, and diversity can thrive.
Cultural creativity, in a wide-ranging sense, depends upon a strategic combination of innovation and the capacity to anticipate and
recognize the potential significance of an innovation. In the light of
historical climaxes of creativity-explosion in many groups and civilizations, it is preferable, in a search for a world community of
human dignity, to rely upon the initiatives of humanity as a whole
rather than upon those of a supercaste with power permanently to
domineer over their fellow beings.
[P]rivacy is not just one possible means among others to insure some other

value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most
fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is not merely a
good technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without
privacy they are simply inconceivable.
Id. at 477. See also C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 137-52 (1970).
87.

Rossiter, The Pattern of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY 15, 17 (M. Konvitz

& C. Rossiter eds. 1958). See also H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1958);
C. CLARKE, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL (1972) (Ditchley
paper No. 41); D. MADGWICK, PRIVACY UNDER ATTACK (1968); H. ROELOFS, THE
TENSION OF CITIZENSHIP: PRIVATE MAN AND PUBLIC DUTY (1957); E. SHILS, THE
TORMENT OF SECRECY 21-27, 201-07 (1956); Shils, Social Inquiry and the Autonomy
of the Individual, in THE HUMAN MEANING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 114 (D.

Lemer ed. 1959).
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To cultivate the high creativity of humanity as a whole, it is
important that the range of individual choice be made as wide as
possible and that effective conditions be created and sustained to
stimulate awareness of the full range of personal potential. This
requires that protection be extended not only to the isolated action
of the individual, but also to the collective action of individuals
acting in and through groups. An individual, acting qua individual,
of course finds self-fulfillment and makes a contribution to the
common interest in varying degrees and various ways, differing
from community to community. Yet, in today's world of complex
interdependences and pluralism where an individual is often overwhelmed by a deep sense of powerlessness, individuals can ultimately find greatest self-fulfillment, and make their richest contribution to common interest, only when they are also free to form
groups of various types, identify with many different groups, and
participate in group activities in the shaping and sharing of
values. 88 If the aggregate freedom of choice is to be secured in a
world of rich creativity and diversity, the protection of civic order
must, therefore, be extended to groups as well as individuals. In
the contemporary world, many people still achieve a sense of
respect-self-esteem and esteem by others-only through intense
group identifications. As Isaacs has said: "Some individuals derive
sufficient self-esteem out of the stuff of their individual personalities alone. Others have to depend on their group associations
88. See generally B. DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD 56-70 (J. Huntington trans. 1963); A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J. Mayer ed. 1969); H. EHRMANN, INTEREST GROUPS ON FOUR
CONTINENTS (1958); ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE (N. Glazer & D.
Moynihan eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as ETHNICITY]; THE GOVERNMENT OF
ASSOCIATIONS: SELECTIONS FROM THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (W.

Glaser & D. Sills

eds. 1966); GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP ANTAGONISMS (R. MacIver ed. 1944); H.
GUETZKOW, MUTLIPLE LOYALTIES (1955); J. KLEIN, THE STUDY OF GROUPS (1956);
W. KORNHAUSER, THE POL1TICS OF MASS SOCIETY (1959); J. LADoR-LEDERER,
INTERNATIONAL GROUP PROTECTION (1968); H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER
AND SOCIETY 25-51 (1950); G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1966); M. MOSKOWITZ, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 123-73 (1968); R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (1953); PRIVATE
GOVERNMENT (S. Lakoff ed. 1973); S. SCHACHTER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFILIATION (1959); P. SECORD & C. BACKMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1974); W.
SPROTT, HUMAN GROUPS (1958); S. STOLJAR, GROUPS AND ENTITIES: AN INQUIRY
INTO CORPORATE THEORY (1973); VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS (NOMOS XI, J. Pen-

nock & J. Chapman eds. 1969); Affeldt & Seney, Group Sanctions and Personal
Rights-Professions,Occupations and Labor Law, 11 ST. Louis L.J. 382 (1967) and
12 ST. LOUIS LJ. 179 (1968); Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. REV. 331 (1958);
Interest Groups in InternationalPerspective, 413 THE ANNALS (1974).
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to supply what their own individualities may often deny them." 8 9
It is "this need for self-esteem, the need to acquire it, feel it, assert it," 90 that has generated the respect revolution of our time and
has pointed to the critical need for affording the utmost autonomy
to groups as well as individuals in ways compatible with the common interest. It may be recalled that freedom of choice can be
manifested in many different ways in different cultures, allowing a
diversity in expression and priorities through time.
The better securing of the basic policies of civic order requires
the systematic and deliberate management of effective power and
authoritative decision at all community levels-global, regional,
and national. 91 It is the whole matrix of decision, constitutive and
public order, taken in the aggregate, that protects and maintains
the civic order. It may seem somewhat visionary to suggest that a
power elite be animated by the goal of aggregate freedom of choice
of individuals and that power be made consciously to discipline
itself.9 2 Yet, a realistic aspiration for improved civic order must
seek, not the unattainable goal of altogether eliminating power in
89. Isaacs, Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe, in ETHNICITY, supra
note 88, at 29, 35.
90. Id. at 36.
91. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
92. The development of the common law and of constitutionalism more generally
suggests that it is not entirely utopian to seek the self-limitation of effective power.
How the predispositions of effective elites may be managed to secure the establishment of appropriate constitutive process is an inquiry to which we give attention
elsewhere. Some indication of the conditions that affect decision and of relevant
strategies for change is made in the conclusion to this article.
The general problem of securing civic order would not appear essentially different
from that involved in creating the predispositions (and institutions) necessary to the
maintenance of minimum order. A comprehensive statement of the more important
conditions is offered in Lasswell, The Social and Political Framework of War and
Peace, in AGGRESSION AND DEFENSE: NEURAL MECHANISMS AND SOCIAL PATTERNS

317 (C. Clemente & D. Lindsley eds. 1967). For an outline of recommended
strategies, see M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 375-83 (1961).
In the latter reference the general problem is defined as follows:
The task of highest priority . . .for every one genuinely committed to the
goal values of a world public order of human dignity would, accordingly,
appear to be that of creating in all peoples of the world the perspectives
necessary both to their realistic understanding of this common interest and
to their acceptance and initiation of the detailed measures in sanctioning
process appropriately designed to secure such interest. It is, as we have
seen, the conflicting, confused, and disoriented perspectives of peoples
-such as the syndromes in expectations of violence, patterns of parochial
identification, and demands for domination-and not the inexorable requirements of environmental factors, which keep alive the contention of
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the social process, but rather the conscientious employment of
power to maximize the aggregate freedom of choice in the shaping
and sharing of values. 93
The essential requirement is that civic order interests be put
under public order guarantee. 94 A dynamic society is always creworld orders, with such appalling threat for all mankind. The maximization
postulate-that men act within their capabilities to maximize their values

-suggests that by appropriate modifications in perspectives the peoples of
the world can be encouraged to move toward both the establishment of a
more effective constitutive process and the making of more rational specific
sanctioning decisions. It is common ground of both historical knowledge and
contemporary science that the factors-culture, class, interest, personality,
and crisis-which most directly condition peoples' perspectives can be
changed and managed to promote constructive rather than destructive perspectives. Promising alternatives in communication and collaboration designed to promote the perspectives appropriate to the maintenance of
minimum order and, with minimum order, opportunity for peaceful progress
toward a more comprehensive public order of human dignity, have long
been recommended by competent specialists upon different instruments of
policy and different value processes, and await employment in sufficiently
comprehensive, integrated, and disciplined programs.
Id. at 376.
93. Our position is thus in clear distinction to various versions of anarchism that
project total abolition of power in social process. The revival of interest in anarchism
is shown by the recent proliferation of literature and reproduction of classic works.
See ANARCHISM (R. Hoffinan ed. 1970); ANARCHISM TODAY (D. Apter & J. Joll eds.
1971); M. BAKUNIN, GOD AND THE STATE (Dover ed. 1970); BAKUNIN ON ANARCHY
(S. Dolgoff ed. 1972); G. BALDELLI, SOCIAL ANARCHISM (1971); A. CARTER, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF ANARCHISM (1971); THE ESSENTIAL KROPOTKIN (E. Capouya
& K. Tompkins eds. 1975); THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF ANARCHISM (M. Schatz ed.
1972); W. GODWIN, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON GENERAL VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS (R. Preston ed. 1926); E. GOLDMAN,
ANARCHISM, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1969); D. GUERIN, ANARCHISM: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE (1970); J. JOLL, THE ANARCHISTS (1964); A. MASTERS, BAKUNIN, THE
FATHER OF ANARCHISM

(1974);

PATTERNS OF ANARCHY

(L. Krimerman & L. Perry

eds. 1966); H. READ, ANARCHY AND ORDER: ESSAYS IN POLITICS (1971); J. REIMAN,
IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL PHILSOPHY: A REPLY TO ROBERT PAUL WOLFF'S IN
DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1972); G. RUNKLE, ANARCHISM: OLD AND NEw (1972); B.
RUSSELL, PROPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM:
SOCIALISM, ANARCHISM AND
SYNDICALISM (1931); R. SCALAPINO & G. YU, THE CHINESE ANARCHIST MOVEMENT
(1961); C. WARD, ANARCHY IN ACTION (1973); R. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF
ANARCHISM (1970); G. WOODCOCK, ANARCHISM: A HISTORY OF LIBERTARIAN IDEAS
AND MOVEMENTS (1962).
For a contemporary philosophical exposition expousing "the minimal state," see R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Nozcik, like Rawls (J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)), is largely concerned with establishing restraints upon

the exercise of power by derivational logic. There are of course limits to the enlightenment that can be achieved by this technique.
94. The importance of public order in protecting private choice is affirmed from
many philosophical perspectives. See Frankel, supra note 8; Fuller, Freedom-A
Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1955).
One alternative Frankel does not adequately consider is the postulation of a comprehensive set of goal values without suggestion that these values have a base in any
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ating novel arrangements in the shaping and sharing of values and
generating a continuum of expectations about the severity and
mildness of possible sanctions. With a wide range of expectations
in constant flux, some events become incorporated through decision in the body of public order, some remain within the sphere of
civic order. The boundary separating the civic order from the public order is inherently fluid and changing in an ever-changing
world. Expectations of severe sanctions attending a particular institutional practice may become weakened or disappear through
time, thereby transforming a matter of public order concern to that
of civic order. Conversely, when expectations of sanctions become
severe within a particular conventional civic context, civic order
ceases to be so in that particular context; a functional change is
taking place, and the organized community steps directly into the
picture. The tension generated by the fluidity of the ever-changing
boundary between civic and public order is especially pronounced
in the contemporary epoch of accelerating change, as characterized
by fantastic gropings and innovativeness in lifestyle, technology and
95
community practice.
In the light of the dynamic relationship between civic order
and public order in this interdependent world of accelerating
changes, it is immensely important that the whole flow of comprehensive public order decisions, including constitutive decisions,
be positively managed in a way as to promote the largest domain of
civic order. This positive management must require, as has been
discussed, the appropriate accommodation of different individual
and community interests when they become incompatible with
each other. 96 The aggregate freedom of choice of individuals and
groups can only be augmented when a vigorous public order exhibits effective constitutive processes of authoritative decision and a
flow of particular decisions about the shaping and sharing of values
which incorporate and manifest the values of human dignity.
III.

Trends in Decision
Since civic order entails the totality of freedom of choice of all
individuals in regard to all values other than power, it is mainkind of natural law philosophy. Such a postulation would remove many of the dif-

ficulties Frankel finds in John Stuart Mill and others. See generally The Protection
of Respect, supra note 1, at 927-37.
95. See A. TOFFLER, FuTuRE SHOCK (1971) for development of the theme of ac-

celerating change and its profoundly unsettling implications for the shaping and
sharing of values.
96. See notes 7-52 supra and accompanying text.
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tained and affected by the whole global constitutive process of authoritative decision and the entire flow of public order decisions
which emanate from that process. The quality of civic order and
the expansion or contraction of the domain of civic order in the
larger community can, therefore, be realistically and fully illuminated only by reference to the functioning of the various constitutive processes of authoritative decision-global, regional and national-and to the flow of public order decisions that emerge from
such processes for the regulation of each of the different value processes.
The full impact of all these constitutive processes, including
both transnational and national, upon the achievement and maintenance of an appropriate civic order depends of course upon the
degree to which the important features of such processes both reflect and secure the common interest in human dignity values. The
relevant decisions in any constitutive process are those which
shape its more important features, such as:
the degree to which parties who are affected by decision
are both represented in the making of such decision and
held accountable to basic community policies;
the comprehensiveness and clarity with which the more
fundamental policies, for which the process is maintained,
articulate a common interest in human dignity values;
the adequacy of structures of authority and their openness
in access and capabilities for insuring compulsory attendance;
the extent to which prescriptions from all communities
are established and maintained for the protection of freedom of choice, with bases in effective power marshalled
in support of authority;
the availability of prompt and dependable procedures in
decision process, which both reflect due process and involve no unnecessary coercion or other invasion of individual rights;
and, finally, the various different outcomes in decision
necessary, comprehensively and economically, to secure
the common interests of all individuals and groups in the
goal values of human dignity.
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The different types of decision outcomes required for the better protection of civic order may be specified as including: an intelligence function, which is dependable and creative, but involving
no unnecessary invasions of civic order; a promotion function,
which is effective and integrative, but open and nonoppressive; a
prescribing function, which establishes appropriate stability in expectations about authority and control, while giving all opportunity
to every individual to participate by word and deed in the clarification of common interest; an invocation function, which is responsive, timely and nonprovocative, affording full opportunty for challenge of the lawfulness of all acts, public or private; an application
function, which is uniform, effective and constructive, while conducted with appropriate notice, hearing, fairness and dispatch; a
termination function, which is balanced in relation to conservation
and change and appropriate amelioration of the destructive impact
of change; and an appraisal function, which is independent and
continuous, facilitating inquiry about the adequacy of past decision
process to serve postulated goals. It scarcely needs observation that
the studies necessary to evaluate the impact upon civic order of
contemporary constitutive processes of authoritative decision are
97
yet to be made.
The constitutive process of authoritative decision in any community typically establishes and maintains a complex network of
prescriptive codes, notably supervisory, regulatory, enterprisory
and corrective. The supervisory code relates to the private activities concerning which the community decision-maker operates
much in the role of umpire at the initiative of the parties. The
different supervisory codes, such as thise embodied in the law of
agreement and the law of deprivationi, establish a framework of
expectations which enable members of the community to take the
initiative to shape and share values by agreement (persuasion) in
confidence that expectations created in their interactions will be
honored and that unauthorized deprivations will be redressed. The
97. For some preliminary indications of the present state of the global constitutive process of authoritative decision, see McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE FuTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969). For a brief indica-

tion of some recommended policies relating to the world constitutive process of authoritative decision, see McDougal, supra note 11, at 415-19. For more detailed development with regard to one decision function, see McDougal, Lasswell,
& Reisman, The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
(1973).
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regulatory codes of a free society are designed to defend or foster
the attainment of substantive criteria and institutional routines that
facilitate freedom of choice in shaping and sharing values.
The enterprisory code relates to the activities performed directly by the community acting through official, territorially inclusive institutions; it authorizes direct governmental activities and
lays down the basic guides for administration. With the general
growth of socializing tendencies, the scope of government management has vastly increased, going far beyond such traditional
functions as national defence and the maintenance of internal order
through organized military and police force. Many enterprisory activities significantly contribute to the achievement of effective and
meaningful participation by all members of the community in the
shaping and sharing of all values.
The distinctive task of the corrective code is to specify the criteria and measures appropriate for the maintenance of responsible,
nondestructive participation in the system of public order; it is indispensable to protection of the genuine freedom of choice of individuals. In short, these different and complex codes invoke differing degrees of community interference with the individual's
freedom of choice, thereby affecting the civic order in various ways
98
and in varying degrees.
The public order decisions, emanating from the constitutive
processes of authoritative decision, also importantly determine the
quality of civic order achievable in global social process. These decisions include the totality of human rights decisions, both in prescription and application, both transnational and national, that
permeate all value processes. It may thus be observed that the
whole contemporary human rights program is designed towards ultimate attainment of a civic order in which the aggregate freedom
of choice of individuals and groups is made secure, effective and
meaningful, and is sustained by the whole matrix of decision, constitutive and public order. Most of the human rights prescriptions,
as embodied in the United Nations Charter, the International Bill
of Rights (i.e., the Universal Declaration and the two Covenants)
and their ancillary expressions, general and particular, are relevant
in varying degrees to the attainment and maintenance of a global
civic order. 99 Civic order is, in the sense we specify, the summa98. See The Public Interest, supra note 12, at 73-76.
99. A collection of the more important global human rights prescriptions is offered in UNITED NATIONS, HuMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL
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tion of all protection of interests in freedom of choice. This summation is a function of the kind of accommodation that is achieved in
a comprehensive public order, as outlined in the preceding section.1 00 Inclusive accommodation comprises an entire tapestry of
particular accommodations in ever-changing contexts.
Though the human rights prescriptions make no literal reference to "civic order" as such, they do contain distinctive components which, taken in the aggregate and considered in the light of
their potential development, afford promise of a closer approximation to our recommended civic order. Of foremost importance is
Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 0 1 which
projects a comprehensive "social and international order" that
would embrace both a comprehensive public order and civic order
as we have defined them. This Article, it may be recalled, reads:
Everyone is entitled to a social and international
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
02
Declaration can be fully realized.'
The "full" realization of the human rights and freedoms which are
set forth in the Universal Declaration and which range through
many value categories, would be possible only if people were to
enjoy the protection of a comprehensive framework of public order, protecting their interests not only in all hitherto recognized
rights but also in emerging interests not presently specified in the
human rights instruments.
Another critically relevant provision is Article 30 of the Universal Declaration, discussed in other emphasis above, which
states:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
herein. 103
INSTRMIENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doe. ST/HR/1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS]. See also BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
HUMiAN RIGHTS (I. Brownlie ed. 1971); BAsIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 20.
100. See notes 7-52 supra and accompanying text.
101. Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 28, U.N. Doc. AJ810, at 76.
102. Id.
103. Id. art. 30, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 77.
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This article, as will be developed, may eventually emerge as a
close approximation to the ninth amendment of the United States
Constitution, which embodies the common law presumption that
choices not expressly prohibited to people are reserved as within
the scope of their aggregate freedom.' 0 4 Comparable provisions,
as previously indicated, are contained in the two Covenants and
the two regional human rights Conventions, European and
05
American.
The right to "participate in the cultural life of the community '10 6 is an important manifestation and a critical component
of civic order. Thus conceived, the cultural rights, as enunciated in
the transnational human rights prescriptions, assume far greater
significance than is generally recognized. In Article 22, which is
authoritatively interpreted as employing the concept of social security, "not in the technical sense of social insurance and other
social assistance,' 0 7 but more comprehensively to include "all the
social and economic freedoms necessary to ensure the individual's
well-being,"' 0 8 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to
social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State,
of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality.- 0 9
In amplification Article 27 provides both highly general and more
specific protection:
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author."10
104. See notes 161-65 infra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
106. Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 27, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 76.
107. N. ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 133,
108. Id.
109. Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 22, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 75.
110. Id. art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 76.
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As befitting its title, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights"1 is more detailed in its formulation of
cultural rights. Article 15 provides:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this
right shall include those necessary for the conservation,
the development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake
to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and
development of international contacts
and co-operation in
11 2
the scientific and cultural fields.

111.

Covenant on Economic Rights, supra note 24.

112. Id. art. 15, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 51.
On the regional level, the protection of cultural rights is enshrined in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Article 13 reads:
Every person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits that result from
intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries.
He likewise has the right to the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or artistic works of
which he is the author.
BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 189-90. The American Convention on Human
Rights, in Article 26, also provides:
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and
through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other
appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic,
social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter
of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of
Buenos Aires.
American Convention, supra note 28, art. 26, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 109. It is
unfortunate, however, that the European Convention on Human Rights, for reasons
unclear, contains no comparable prescription.
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The scope and potential significance of these novel prescriptions for the protection of cultural rights were amply examined
and illuminated in 1970 by a panel of experts exploring the subject
of "Cultural Rights as Human Rights" under the auspices of
UNESCO. 113 These experts generally took a very comprehensive
view of both culture and cultural rights. The "Statement on Cultural Rights as Human Rights" adopted by the panel began in
broad conception: "Culture is a human experience which it is difficult to define, but we recognize it as the totality of ways by which
men create designs for living. It is a process of communication between men; it is the essence of being human. '" 1 14 Encompassing
"spiritual and material values," 115 culture refers, the panel asserts,
to "everything which enables man to be operative and active in his
world, and to use all forms of expression more and more freely to
16
establish communication among men."'
113. UNESCO, Cultural Rights as Human Rights, 3 STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS
ON CULTURAL POLICIES (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cultural Rights].
114. Id. at 105.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 105-06.
The individual experts gave "culture" a variety of definitions, including: "the essence of being human," id. at 10; "everything that concerns intellectual, ethical,
physical, even technical training," id. at 15; "the sum of total human activities," id.;
"interaction," id. at 39; "the sum total of material and spiritual values, created by
man in the process of socio-historical practice," id. at 43; "the result of man's creative activity in the material and spiritual sphere," id. at 45; and "the never-ending
curiosity towards the physical, the psychological and the spiritual-the unceasing
wonder and reverence towards the ultimate facts of life," id. at 70.
In social sciences, the classic definition of culture was that of Edward B. Tylor:
"Culture . . . taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and
habits acquired by man as a member of society." E. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE 1
(1871). This definition has been widely adopted, with appropriate modifications, by
social scientists in various disciplines.
After a comprehensive survey, Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn summed
up the consensus of most social scientists in these terms: "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols,
constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically
derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values ....
" Kroeber &
Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, 47 PAPERS OF
THE PEABODY MUSEUM OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY 181 (1952).
Malinowski suggested an inquiry into cultures in terms of the "function" of each
component of the total culture. See Malinowski, Culture, in 4 ENCYS. Soc. Sci. 621
(1931). See also R. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1959); B. MALINOWSKI, A
SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF CULTURE, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1960 ed.); B. MALINOWSKI,
THE SEXUAL LIFE OF SAVAGES (1932).
For our own definition, see H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, supra note 88, at 47-51.
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The comprehensiveness with which the experts perceived culture was carried forward in their articulation and interpretation of
the scope of the relevant rights. "By the right of an individual to
culture," in the words of Professor Boutros-Ghali, "it is to be understood that every man has the right of access to knowledge, to
the arts and literature of all peoples, to take part in scientific advancement and to enjoy its benefits, to make his contribution towards the enrichment of cultural life." 117 The panel's final "StateIn a vast literature concerning culture, other useful citations include: S. FREUD,
CHARACTER AND CULTURE.(P. Rieff ed. 1962); S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (1930); C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED
ESSAYS (1973); E. HATCH, THEORIES OF MAN AND CULTURE (1973); J. HONIGMANN,
UNDERSTANDING CULTURE (1963); A. KROEBER, CONFIGURATIONS OF CULTURAL
GROWTH (1944); A. KROEBER, THE NATURE OF CULTURE (1952); LANGUAGE IN
CULTURE AND SOCIETY (D. Hymes ed. 1964); C. LEvi-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (C. Jacobson & B. Schoepf trans. 1963); R. LINTON, THE STUDY OF
MAN (1936); H. MCLUHAN, CULTURE IS OUR BUSINESS (1970); K. MANNHEIM,
ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE (E. Mannheim & P. Kecskemeti eds.
1956); M. MEAD, CULTURE AND COMMITMENT (1970); M. MEAD, SEX AND
TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITvE SOCIETIES (1963); T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL
SYSTEM (1951); A. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A NATURAL SCIENCE OF SOCIETY (1957); E.
SAPIR, CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND PERSONALITY (D. Mandelbaum ed. 1958);
SCIENCE AND CULTURE (G. Holton ed. 1965); THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD
CRISIS (R. Linton ed. 1945); P. SOROKIN, SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY
(1962); A. WALLACE, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY (1961); L. WHITE, THE SCIENCE
OF CULTURE: A STUDY OF MAN AND CIVILIZATION (1949); R. WILLIAMS, CULTURE
AND SOCIETY (1958); Kluckhohn, The Study of Culture, in THE POLICY SCIENCES 86
(D. Lerner & H. Lasswell eds. 1951).
117. Cultural Rights, supra note 113, at 73.
The views expressed by other experts were no less comprehensive. Thus, Mshvenieradze understood "cultural rights" as
the rights of a human being to labour and education, to free and all-round
development of his or her personality, to an active participation in creating
material and spiritual values as well as using them for further progress of
modem civilization. These values also include science-natural, social, medical, etc.-since it is an integral part of culture.
Id. at 43-44. According to Argan:
It is the right to create culture, or the right which every social group (and, in
certain cases, even every individual) is acknowledged to possess, namely the
right to play an active part in the community, regardless of its (or his) cultural traditions, religious beliefs, scientific and technical knowledge, moral
or political opinions.
Id. at 89. Thapar suggested:
Cultural rights embrace the whole gamut of rights-economic, political, social. They cannot be studied in isolation. And the totality of rights becomes
meaningless when the value system at the base is itself being made irrelevant. This is the core of the problem and cannot be overstressed.
Id. at 93. Martelanc stressed that
[t]he aim of culture should be to free man's personality, to enable him to be
creative, to enable his personality to develop to its full dimensions in order
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ment on Cultural Rights as Human Rights" again offered this apt
summation: "The rights to culture include the possibility for each
man to obtain the means of developing his personality, through his
direct participation in the creation of human values, and of becoming, in this way, responsible for his situation, whether local or on a
world scale."" 8 In sum, it would appear that the increasing demands and aspirations for wider application of cultural rights, as
articulated and represented by the panel experts, may ultimately
contribute significantly to the formation of a global civic order.
The protection of civic order is appropriately extended to
groups as well as individuals. As indicated above, group expression, no less than individual expression, is essential to individual
self-fulfillment and to the optimalization of aggregate common
interest.1 1 9 The freedom to form voluntary groups (associations), to
have access to group membership, to participate in group activities, and to maintain internal group autonomy is critical in
that he may take an active part in everyday life; he should not just be the
object of the policy of a State.
Id. at 82.
118. Id. at 107.
If we turn from individual to group perspectives, it appears that Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is relevant. This provision provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 27, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) at 56. The Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in November 1966, proclaims in Article 1:
1. Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved.
2. Every people has the right and the duty to develop its culture.
3. In their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they
exert on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to all mankind.
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 99, at 103; Cultural Rights, supra
note 109, at 107. This formulation is in recognition of what some experts call "the
rights of cultures," as distinguished from the rights to culture.
The Director-General of UNESCO emphasized:
In the individual nation, as in the world as a whole, any living culture is
entitled to be preserved so that it may realize its full human potentialities,
for a culture is essentially a certain way of living as a human being and the
decline of a culture, unless it is absorbed into a new culture that takes its
place, entails an impoverishment of mankind as a whole.
Report of the Director-General of UNESCO, U.N. Doe. A/9227 at 11 (1973).
119. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
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achieving an aggregate pattern of interaction in which individual
autonomy is secured. The degree to which such protection is afforded serves as one barometer of the state of civic order in a given
community. Such protection has traditionally been clustered about
generic freedom of association, and concomitantly, freedom of as20
sembly.1
The Universal Declaration, in Article 20, provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an as12 1
sociation.
In its Article 22, with a built-in accommodation clause, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this
right other than those which are prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order
(ordrepublic), the protection of public health or morals or
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This
Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in
12 2
their exercise of this right.

Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights reads in
part:
120.

On freedom of association, see G. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY

AND ASSOCIATION (1961); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

675-96 (1970); D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION (1963); R.
HORN, GROuPs AND THE CONSTrI-TION (AMS ed. 1971); M. KONVITZ, EXPANDING

LIBERTIES 48-85 (1967); C. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962); A Symposium
on Group Interests and the Law, 13 RUT. L. REv. 427 (1959); Elias, Freedom of
Assembly and Association, 8 J. INT'L CONIM'N JURISTS 60 (1967); Emerson, Freedom
of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Nathanson, The
Right of Association, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 231 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
For an articulation of the intimate connection between freedom of association and
the right to privacy, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 20, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 75.
122. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 22, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and to join trade unions for the protec123
tion of his interests.
Comparable prescription is also found in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 124 and the American Convention on Human Rights. 1 2 5 Article 22 of the American Declaration states:
Every person has the right to associate with others
to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate interests
cultural, profesof a political, economic, religious, social,
126
sional, labor union or other nature.
Article 16 of the American Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural,
sports, or other purposes.
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such
restrictions established by law as may be necessary in a
democratic society, in the interest of national security,
public safety or public order, or to protect public health
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition
of legal restrictions, including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of association, on members of the
27
armed forces and the police.1
123.

European Convention, supra note 26, art. 11(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.

Paragraph 2 of this Article reads:
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the
armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
Id.
For the application of Article 11, see F. CASTBERG, supra note 50, at 152-56; J.
FAWCETT, supra note 50, at 222-24; "HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS,"

supra note 27, at 43-46; F. JACOBS, supra note 50, at 157-61.
124. American Declaration, supra note 20.
125. American Convention, supra note 28.
126.

American Declaration, supra note 20, art. 22, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note

20, at 191 (emphasis added).
127.

American Convention, supra note 28, art. 16, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at

106 (emphasis added).
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It will be observed that these provisions make explicit, what is
implicit in the other transnational prescriptions mentioned
above, 128 that their protection extends to a wide range of groups
specialized to the shaping and sharing of different values.
It is recognized that privacy, even in its most technical aspect,
is part of civic order. 129 In its most comprehensive sense the conception of privacy can be indefinitely expanded toward the totality
of civic order. In a provision, Article 12, which is broader than the
technical concept of privacy and pregnant with potentiality for
further expansion, the Universal Declaration stipulates:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference
130
or attacks.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in Article
17, provides:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such intereference or attacks. 1 1
On the regional level, both the European Convention on Human
Rights 132 and the American Convention on Human Rights 133 employ "private life" in lieu of "privacy." Article 8 of the European
Convention, with a built-in accommodation clause, reads:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
128. See notes 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 56-58, 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
130. Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 73-74.

131.
GAOR,
132.
133.

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 17, 21 U.N.
Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
European Convention, supra note 26.
American Convention, supra note 28.
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the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
34

others. 1

Article 11 of the American Convention states:
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected
and his dignity recognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his
correspondence, or unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
3 5
against such interference or attacks.1
These provisions, it is clearly agreed, reiterate the longcherished protections that have been extended to private life in
terms of the inviolability of the home, freedom from unwarranted
searches and seizures, the integrity of the family life, the secrecy of
correspondence through different modalities, protection against unauthorized use of a person's name, identity or likeness, and protection against attacks upon honor or reputation.' 30 What is less clear
is the potential scope of references that may appropriately be accorded the concept of "privacy" or "private life" in future application. This question has aroused growing attention and interest, as
modern technology and the modem corporate machines, governmental and non-governmental, pose increasing threats to the free13 7
doms of individuals and groups.
A number of official and nonofficial clarificatory efforts suggest
that "privacy" and "private life" may admit of considerable expansion of their historic references. In his report on privacy prepared
134. European Convention, supra note 26, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230. For discussions of the relevant issues, see F. CASTBERG, supra note 50, at 138-45; J. FAWCETT,

supra note 50, at 185-97; "HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS," supra note 27,
at 29-33; F. JACOBS, supra note 50, at 125-43; Danelius, A Survey of the Jurisprudence Concerning the Rights Protected by the European Convention on Human
Rights, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 431, 452-57 (1975); Robertson, The Promotion of Human
Rights by the Council of Europe, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 545, 554-65 (1975).
135.

American Convention, supra note 28, art. 11, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

at 105.
136. See U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80, at 19-26. See generally H.
GROSS, PRIVACY-ITS LEGAL PROTECTION (1964); Greenawalt, The Right of Privacy,
in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 299 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971).

137. See notes 70-80 supra and accompanying text.
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in 1973 at the request of the General Assembly, 1 3 8 the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, without attempting to elaborate "a
concise international definition of privacy"' 3 9 or to "spell out in
140
detail the components which make up the right to privacy,'
makes the observation that
the very existence of an internationally-recognized right to
privacy presupposes agreement that there are certain
areas of the individual's life that are outside the concern
of either governmental authorities or the general public,
138. U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80. The Proclamation of Teheran,
adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968, declared:
While recent scientific discoveries and technological advances have opened
vast prospects for economic, social and cultural progress, such developments
may nevertheless endanger the rights and freedoms of individuals and will
require continuing attention ....
United Nations, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, at 5, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.32/41 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Final Act]. The Conference proceeded to urge the undertaking of a study on the
question of human rights and scientific and technological developments. Id. at 12.
Acting upon the recommendation of the Conference, the General Assembly in December 1968 adopted a resolution, urging the Secretary-General to undertake such a
study and to prepare a preliminary report for the Commission on Human Rights to
consider. It urged that particular attention be paid to the following:
(a) Respect for the privacy of individuals and the integrity and sovereignty
of nations in the light of advances in recording and other techniques;
(b) Protection of the human personality and its physical and intellectual integrity, in the light of advances in biology, medicine and biochemistry;
(c) Uses of electronics which may affect the rights of the person and the
limits which should be placed on such uses in a democratic society;
(d) More generally, the balance which should be established between scientific and technological progress and the intellectual, spiritual, cultural and
moral advancement of humanity.
G.A. Res. 2450, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
Subsequently, the preliminary report prepared by the Secretary-General, U.N.
Docs. E/CN.411028, Add. 1-6 and Add. 3/Corr. 1 (1970), was considered by the
Commission on Human Rights at its 27th Session in 1971. In its Resolution 10
(XXVII) of 18 March 1971, the Commission requested the Secretary-General to continue his study on the impacts of scientific and technological developments on
human rights.
The U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80, is the first of a series of reports prepared by the Secretary-General under the mandate of G.A. Res. 2450, as reinforced
by the Commission on Human Rights. For further details, see U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80, at 4-8; United Nations, United Nations Action in the Field
of Human Rights 118-19, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2 (1974). For other related documents
in the series on "Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Developments,"
see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1141 (1973); U.N. Doc. E/CN.41142 (1972); U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/1142!Add.1 (1974).
139. U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80, at 13.
140. Id.
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areas which may vary in size from country to country but
which do possess a common central core. 141
Underscoring that the exercise of the right of freedom of information and of expression "must not be allowed to destroy the existence of" the right to privacy under Article 8 of the European
Convention, 142 the Declaration on Mass Communication Media
and Human Rights, adopted in 1970 by the Consultative Assembly
of the Council of Europe, affirmed:
The right to privacy consists essentially in the right
to live one's own life with a minimum of interference. It
concerns private, family and home life, physical and moral
integrity, honour and reputation, avoidance of being
placed in a false light, nonrevelation of irrelevant and
embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication of private
photographs, protection from disclosure of information
given or received by the individual confidentially. 143
In a colloquy held in 1970 by the Council of Europe and the
Belgian universities to study the content of Article 8 of the European Convention, different aspects of the problem concerning respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, were
thoroughly explored. 144 The participants generally took a very
broad view of the sphere of private life. Henri Rolin as President
of the European Court of Human Rights, gave this summation:
Private life has seemed to us to be a concept which covers
a very wide field. Various members expressed the view
that it must be taken to include protection against attacks
on physical or moral integrity, moral or intellectual freedom, on honour or reputation, protection against the improper use of one's name or image, against activities for
the purpose of spying or keeping a watch on or harassing
persons, and against divulging information covered by
professional secrecy. 145
141.
142.
at 908,
143.

Id.
EuR. CONsULT. Ass., Res. 428 (1970), in COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 37,
910.
Id. at 911.

144.

PRIVACY AND HuMAN RIGHTS (A. Robertson ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as

PRIVACY AND HuMAN RIGHTS].

145. Rolin, Conclusions, in id. at 425.
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Professor Rolin also noted that "the colloquy achieved a very wide
consensus in favour of the view ' 14 6 that Article 8 of the Convention
protects against encroachments from both governmental and non147
governmental sources.
Similarly, the Nordic Conference on the Right to Privacy of
1967, attended by many jurists from different parts of the world,
concluded with a note that projected a relatively comprehensive
view about privacy. 14 8 Among its "Conclusions" was this statement:
The Right to Privacy is the right to be let alone to
live one's own life with the minimum degree of interference. In expanded form, this means:
The right of the individual to lead his own life
protected against: (a) interference with his private, family and home life; (b) interference with
his physical or mental integrity or his moral or
intellectual freedom; (c) attacks on his honour
and reputation; (d) being placed in a false light;
(e) the disclosure of irrelevant embarrassing facts
relating to his private life; (f) the use of his
name, identity or likeness; (g) spying, prying,
watching and besetting; (h) interference with his
correspondence; (i) misuse of his private communications, written or oral; (j) disclosure of information given or received by him in circumstances of professional confidence ....149
It would thus appear that even in the absence of "a concise
international definition of privacy," 1' 5 0 existing transnational prescriptions concerning privacy or private life are undergoing an expansion in general community expectation that will permit their
application to many important emerging threats to civic order.
The growing transnational concern for the protection of privacy is further manifested, and fortified, by efforts within many
national communities. The intense and widespread involvement
ramifies far beyond the field of informational privacy. The acute
sensitivity aroused by the spread of sophisticated modes of surveil146.

Id. at 428.

147. Id.
148.

Nordic Conference on the Right to Privacy, 31 BULL. INT'L COMM'N OF

JURISTS 1 (1967).

149. Id. at 2.
150. U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80, at 13.
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lance comes at a time when people generally share an everdeepening sense of powerlessness and of loss of individuality as
they experience the grip of enormous corporate organizations, both
governmental and non-governmental. 15 1 Demands asserted in the
name of privacy have, in fact, extended far beyond privacy in the
restricted sense of control over information about oneself. "Privacy" is quickly becoming the potent catch symbol for a constellation of demands which, functionally, are demands for civic order
-for the utmost practicable freedom of choice in the shaping and
sharing of aggregate values. Despite the not inconsiderable controversy involved in its delimitation, 15 2 the contemporary renaissance of the right of "privacy" has already generated a far-reaching
beneficent effect upon the protection of the basic right of respect.
These developments are most dramatically exemplified by recent trends in the United States. The Supreme Court, in a series
of decisions, has expounded and upheld the protection of privacy
in such a degree that for all practical purposes the right of "privacy" is becoming a functional equivalent of what we call "civic
order." From the well-worn article by Warren and Brandeis in
1890,153 through Justice Brandeis' celebrated dissent espousing
4
"the right to be let alone" in Olmstead v. United States in 1928,15
151. See notes 70-80 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text. See also note 169 infra.
153. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). It has
become a ritual for commentators, in discussing the right to privacy, to begin by
paying tribute to this pioneer article. It was of course an innovation in its time. The
authors proposed freedom from unwanted communication. Their occasional reference to the right "to be let alone," id. at 195, as borrowed from Judge Cooley, embodied a broader conception, close to autonomy. Id. at 198-214. This reference has
the germ of what we mean by civic order.
At its time the article was innovative also in its suggestions for remedy-through
tort or criminal law. What the contemporary observer can add is the possibility of
protection and implementation as a human right. Attempts to find relevant tort and
criminal law are not enough. These efforts need to be integrated in a comprehensive
human rights program.
154. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In this case, Justice Brandeis, contrary to the opinion of the Court, took the position that wire-tapping, though
involving no physical invasion, was in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments
of the Constitution. In his words:
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
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to the decision of Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965,155 the right to
privacy has come to vigorous life.
In Griswold, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional, as applied to a married couple, a Connecticut statute forbidding the use
of contraceptives, because it intruded upon the right of marital privacy, an aspect of a more general constitutional right of privacy. In
formulating a general right of privacy, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, emphasized that "the zone of privacy [is] created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,"156 as "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."' 157 Thus conceived, the zone of privacy is, directly or
peripherally, protected by the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments.' 5 8 Justice Douglas observed that the
Court was dealing with "a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system..159
The separate opinion by Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, after concurring in Justice Douglas' opinion, proceeded to an independent ground by applying and reviving the "forgotten" ninth amendment.' 60 The ninth
amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."' 6 ' Characterizing the right of privacy as
"a fundamental personal right, emanating 'from the totality of the
constitutional scheme under which we live,' "162 one that was
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most

valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 484.
See id. at 481-86.
Id. at 486. For an elaboration of this theme, see Konvitz, Privacy and the

Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 272 (1966). Although

"privacy" is often assumed to be "a distinctly modem notion," Westin asserts that
"the modem claim to privacy derives first from man's animal origins and is shared,
in quite real terms, by men and women living in primitive societies." A. WEsTIN,
supra note 58, at 7.
160. 381 U.S. at 491.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
162. 381 U.S. at 494.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

' retained by the people' within the meaning of the Ninth
Amendment,"' 16 3 Mr. Justice Goldberg declared that "the Ninth
Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first
eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included
there not be deemed exhaustive."' 1 64 He added:
The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be regarded by some as a recent discovery and may be forgotten by others, but since 1791 it has been a basic part of
the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold. To hold
that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted
in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be
infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many
words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect
65
whatsoever.1
In their respective concurring opinions, Justices Harlan and
White clearly dissociated themselves from the opinion of the Court
and invalidated the Connecticut statute simply for having deprived
163. Id. at 499.
164. Id. at 492.
165. Id. at 491. Justice Goldberg sought, however, to dismiss the idea that "the
Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of rights protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government." Id. at 492.
In contrast, Emerson observes that "Mr. Justice Goldberg discussed it [the ninth
amendment] at length, but his opinion seems to give it a more limited significance."
Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 227 (1965).
In Emerson's view, "Mr. Justice Douglas' use of the ninth amendment carries a

greater potential. Under his theory, the ninth amendment might be utilized to expand the concept of privacy or, perhaps, to guarantee other basic rights." Id. at 228.
For vindication of Emerson's view, see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-39
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
For discussion of the potentialities of the ninth amendment, see E. CORWIN, THE
"HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1965); B.
PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Dunbar, James Madison

and the Nineth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627 (1956); Franklin, The Relation of
the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Third Constitution, 4 How.
L.J. 170, 174-78 (1958); Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment,
33 U. Cm. L. REV. 814 (1966); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936); Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The
"Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121 (1967); Paust, Human
Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
231 (1975); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People?," 37
N.Y.U.L. REV. 787, 804-10 (1962); Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the
Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1 (1972); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 787 (1959).
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the married couple of " 'liberty' without due process of law,"166
thereby reinvigorating the doctrine of substantive due process
under the fourteenth amendment. 167 Justices Black and Stewart
dissented on the grounds that the so-called "right of privacy" found
no support in the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights and that
the Court, in interpreting the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, must refrain from inventing a new right not grounded
16 8
in the specific guarantees of the Constitution.
Although the precise source of the right of privacy was a matter of contention among the Justices and has since become a favorite subject of continuing debate among commentators, 169 the importance of the Griswold decision cannot be overemphasized.
Griswold established for the first time a generic right to privacy
protected under the Constitution in what had been an ambiguous
situation. It matters little whether the right is derived from the
first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth or fourteenth amendments, or from
customary expectations that have clustered around the original
words. "Penumbras, peripheries, emanations, things fundamental
and things forgotten,"1 70 or whatever, the important fact is that the
Court created constitutional protection for an important human
right and stated that right in broad terms. Thus, with Griswold,
community expectations for greater freedom of choice have been
strengthened, notwithstanding the Court's initial difficulties in finding appropriate justification for the right and the absence of a clear
projection of the perimeter of the zone of privacy.

166.
167.
(White,
168.
169.

381 U.S. at 502.
See id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502-07
J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See S. HUFSTEDLER, THE DIRECTIONS AND MISDIRECTIONS OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1971); Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973); Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Greenwalt, Privacy and Its Legal
Protections, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 45 (1974); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest And The

Trees: Roe v. Wade And Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973); Pollak, Thomas I.
Emerson, Lawyer and Scholar: Ipse Custodiet Custodes, 84 YALE L.J. 638 (1975);
Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973).
170. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965). See also McKay,
The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations,id. at 259.
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In 1969, in Stanley v. Georgia,17 1 the Supreme Court outlawed
a Georgia statute prohibiting possession of obscene materials in
one's own home. Having reaffirmed the constitutional right to "receive information and ideas" under the first amendment,' 72 Mr. Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the Court, hastened to add
that "also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
3
privacy."'17
In 1972, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,' 74 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Massachusetts law which denied unmarried persons access to contraceptives but accorded married persons such
access through a registered physician or through a pharmacist acting pursuant to a physician's prescription. Mr. Justice Brennan,
delivering the opinion of the Court, held the Massachusetts statute
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment for having distinguished single from married persons
in access to contraceptives.' 75 In addition, he took the occasion to
emphasize that the right to privacy enunciated in Griswold is not
confined to the marital context. Justice Brennan stated:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives
to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.' 76
The creative role of the Supreme Court in Griswold was reaffirmed and further extended in 1973 in Roe v. Wade. 1 77 In Roe the
171.
172.

394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 564.

173.

Id.

174.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

175. Id. at 446-55.
176. Id. at 453 (citation omitted).
177.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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court invalidated a Texas law banning abortion except on " 'medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother' -178 on the
ground that it violated the right of privacy as "founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action." 17 9 The trend of decision that fortifies the
Court's protection of privacy is succinctly summarized by Mr. Justice Blackmun who spoke for the Court:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going
back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford
(1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found
at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment,
Stanley v. Georgia (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, Terry v. Ohio (1968), Katz v. United States
(1967), Boyd v. United States (1886), see Olmstead v.
United States (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the
178. Id. at 118.
179. Id. at 153. Mr. Justice Stewart, reversing his previous position in Griswold,
concurred that Roe's right was clearly "embraced within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 170
(Stewart, J., concurring). In emphasizing the scope of "liberty," he quoted the
Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1971): "In a Constitution
for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad
indeed." 410 U.S. at 168. He added two eloquent statements by Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech,
press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints ... and which also recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Id. at 169 (quoting Justice Harlan's dissent from the dismissal of appeal in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1960)). Justice Stewart continued: "Great concepts like
. . . 'liberty' . . . were purposely left to gather meaning from experience. For they

relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who
founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged."
Id. (quoting Justice Frankfurter's dissent in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)).
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penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut;
in the Ninth Amendment, id. (Goldberg, J., concurring);
or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska
(1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal
rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut
(1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
They also make it clear that the right has some extension
to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia
(1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird; id. (White, J., concurring
in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts
(1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society
80
of Sisters (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.
With the decisive stroke of Roe, "it is no longer necessary," in the
words of Henkin, "to eke out privacy in small pieces as aspects of
other constitutional rights; there is now a Constitutional Right of
Privacy."'81
It will be observed that all these cognate terms and verbalisms
about privacy reflect a struggle to secure a policy that transcends
particular factual contexts and guarantees optimum freedom of
choice to human beings. All decisions that protect the utmost freedom of choice in value shaping and sharing-whether justified in
terms of privacy, the Bill of Rights, substantive due process, the
182
first amendment, the ninth amendment, the penumbra theory,
18
1
8
3
ordered liberty or tort law 4the incorporation theory,
contribute to the sum total of free choice for participating in par180. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
181. Henldn, supra note 169, at 1423.
182. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 481-86. See also Dixon, supra note
56; McKay, supra note 170.
183. See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" In the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963). The gist of the doctrine of "selective incorporation" is that "the
fourteenth amendment incorporates specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, and
those that are "absorbed" at all are incorporated whole and intact, providing protections against the state exactly congruent with those against the federal government."
Id. at 74 (footnote omitted). For an authoritative exposition of this theory, see Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960). See generally Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949);
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, id.
at 140.
184. One of the most influential articles concerning the tort law of privacy is
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). After a comprehensive survey, Dean
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ticular value processes. The inclusive, open-ended potentialities
that now exist for enlarging the scope of freedom of choice is the
very essence of our preferred civic order.
This overriding accent on the freedom of choice that underlies
the contemporary protection of privacy is beginning to gain recognition among commentators. Thus, Henkin writes:
It has been insufficiently noticed that what the Court has
been talking about is not at all what most people mean by
privacy. None of the recent cases, and none of the older
cases the Court cited (except those dealing with search
Prosser concluded that
[t~he law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests ....
1. Intrusion upon [a person's] seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about [a person].
3. Publicity which places [a person] in a false light in the public
eye.
4. Appropriation .. . of [a person's] name or likeness.
Id. at 389. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 802-18
(4th ed. 1971). This fourfold category has been influential not only in the United
States, but also in other lands.
A formidable critic of Prosser has argued that there is only one tort, not four separate torts, of privacy. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964). See also Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY, supra note 56, at 182-98; Green, Continuing the Privacy
Discussion: A Response to Judge Wright And Professor Bloustein, 46 TFx. L. REV.
750 (1968); Kalven, Privacy In Tort Law-Were Warren And Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966). It would appear that Prosser is correct in indicating that the word "privacy" refers to many different interactions and situations
which raise different policy issues. The breakdown of different interactions and situations which Prosser offers is, however, unhappily confined to the acquisition and
communication of information about a person. He does not explore the broader interest of a person to be let alone in his choices as regards a wide range of values.
Similarly, his concern for remedies is confined to those of tort law, with all the
limitations inherent in such law. Nonetheless Bloustein's quarrel would seem largely
a matter of words. Whether one says there is only one tort of privacy orfour different
torts of privacy is tweedledum and tweedledee. What is important is to note significant differences in facts, relevant policies and appropriate remedies.
Some critics reject the tort, property and trust rationales and analogies in regard to
privacy. E.g., A. MMLER, supra note 56, at 169-201. The most effective approach
would appear to be to accept any legal rationale or analogy that leads to improved
human rights protection. The tort, property and trust rationales may in some contexts
afford extremely useful protection of human rights. Taken alone, however, they are
not adequate. What is needed is to invoke the whole constitutive process of authoritative decision, with all different codes, for improved protection of basic human
rights. There is a need, further, not only for improvement in national prescription
and administration, but also for improvement in transnational prescription and application.
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and seizure under the fourth amendment), which the Justices have now swept together into the basket labeled
"right of privacy," deals with any of the matters that are
the subject of the now-massive literature on privacy. 85
In his view, "the Court has been vindicating not a right to
freedom from official intrusion, but to freedom from official regulation,"'186 that is, a right to "autonomy.' 87 Elaborating, Henkin adds:
Primarily and principally the new Right of Privacy is a
zone of prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immunity
from regulation, in addition to that established by the first
amendment. The zone, Justice Blackmun told us, consists
of "personal rights" that can be deemed "fundamental,"
that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." The
right has "some extension" to marriage, sexual relations,
contraception, unwanted children, family relations and
parental autonomy. But we will know which rights are
and which are not within the zone only case by case, with
lines drawn and redrawn, in response to individual and
societal initiatives and the imaginativeness of lawyers., 8
In the same vein, Kalven probes "the relationship of privacy
to autonomy or freedom"'189 as follows:
Do we value privacy only because it is useful to the
strategy of protecting personal freedom or do we value it
for its own sake independently of the practical consequences that intrusions into privacy may entail? Does privacy, absent a concern with freedom, reduce to a trivial
quaint grievance? My deep personal hunch is that the
topic is really freedom and that calling it privacy tends to
obscure matters. In Griswold, for example, is the griev185. Henkin, supra note 169, at 1424 (footnote omitted). For decisions relating to
informational privacy, see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also I N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE,
supra note 80, at 819-45; Schwartz, Reflections on Six Years of Legitimated Electronic Surveillance, in PRIVACY IN A FREE SocIETY, supra note 75, at 38-55; Schwartz,
The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order,"
67 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1969).
186. Henkin, supra note 169, at 1424.
187. Id. at 1425.
188. Id. at 1425-26.
189. Kalvin [sic], "Privacy and Freedom"-A Review, 23 REC. N.Y.C.B.A. 185,

187 (1968).
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ance really the one the Supreme Court selected, namely, the predicted intrusions by police into the bedroom in
the effort to enforce the law? Or is the grievance the law's
to decide whether and when
effort to limit man's freedom
190
he will breed children?
Greenawalt expresses the same insight when he stresses that
"autonomy in choice of behavior is the fundamental value and that
information control and freedom from intrusion are merely instrumental to autonomy."' 191
Precisely because it is freedom of choice that is at stake in
issues involving privacy, Mr. Justice Douglas found it appropriate,
in his concurring opinion in Roe and its companion case, Doe v.
Bolton, 192 to reiterate that "a catalogue of" the constitutionally protected rights "includes customary, traditional, and time-honored
rights, amenities, privileges, and immunities that come within the'
sweep of 'the Blessings of Liberty' mentioned in the preamble to
the Constitution.' 1 93 In amplification, he outlined the following
comprehensive map of that "Liberty" protected under the fourteenth amendment:
First is the autonomous control over the development
and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and
personality.
These are rights protected by the First Amendment
and, in my view, they are absolute, permitting of no exceptions. ...
Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of
one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children.
These rights, unlike those protected by the First
Amendment, are subject to some control by the police
power. . . .These rights are "fundamental," and we have
held that in order to support legislative action the statute
must be narrowly and precisely drawn and that a "compelling state interest" must be shown in support of the
limitation ....

190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Greenawalt, supra note 169, at 49.
410 U.S. 179, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 210.
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Third is the freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom from bodily restraintor compulsion, freedom
to walk, stroll, or loaf.
These rights, though fundamental, are likewise subject to regulation on a showing of "compelling state
194
interest."
While in the United States the protection of civic order finds
increasingly vigorous expression through the expanding right to
privacy, comparable protection has been achieved in other legal
systems under a "general right of the personality."' 195 The policy
underlying the protection of the right to the personality is articulated by the Federal Council of Switzerland in these words:
The right to protection of the part of a person's life which
is personal and secret is an expression of the conviction
that the individual cannot develop his personality unless
he is assured of protection from interference with his private life, by the State or by other persons. This is among
the rights which, in a liberal juridical order, are recognized as the rights to which every individual is entitled by
the very act of being a person. The protection of these
190
rights is one of the duties of the State, based on law.
194. Id. at 211-13 (citations omitted). See also W. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF
LIBERTY 1-52 (1963).

Comparable projections of the contours of freedom of choice of course abound in
earlier decisions. For example, in 1897, the Court declared:
The liberty mentioned [in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment] means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). Similarly, in 1923, the Court stated:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
195. See S. STROMHOLM, RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RIGHTS OF THE PERSONALITY:
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (1967) (Working Paper prepared for the Nordic Conference
on Privacy organized by the International Commission of Jurists, Stockholm, May
1967).
196. Quoted in U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80, at 14.
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The development of this new right is epitomized in the Federal Republic of Germany. The long acknowledged right of
the personality under the German Civil Code1 97 was greatly
strengthened when the Constitution of 1949 formally provided for
the protection of "the free development of one's personality" as a
fundamental right. Article 2 reads:
1. Everyone shall have the right to the free development
of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights
of others or offend against the constitutional order or the
moral code.
2. Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person. The freedom of the individual shall be
inviolable. These rights may only be encroached upon
pursuant to a law. 19 8
This doctrine, under "the energetic affirmations"1 9 9 of judicial decisions and scholarly opinions, exhibits an "inexhaustible character"20 0 in that it is left so open-ended as to embrace a wide range
of protected rights.
The rights protected under this general right of the personality have been divided into three major categories by German
jurists:
(1) the "right to develop one's personality:" 20 1 "the general
freedom of action, the freedom of work, the right of pursuing a
professional, commercial or cultural activity, the freedoms of association, expression, religious and moral activities and education; ' 2 02
197. Two particularly relevant provisions are Articles 823 and 826 which read:
Article 823. I. One who, intentionally or negligently, wrongfully injures
the life, body, health, freedom, property or any other right of another is obligated to compensate him for damage arising therefrom.
II. One who violates a provision of law intended to protect another incurs
the same obligation. If the wording of the provision makes possible its violation without fault, liability for compensation arises only in the presence of
fault.
Article 826. One who intentionally damages another in a manner violating
good morals is obligated to compensate him for such damage.
Translated and quoted in Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany-Pointersfor
American Legislation?, 1965 DuKE L.J. 481, 518. See also S. STROMHOLM, supra
note 195, at 54-58.
198. Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 8, 1949, as amended to
January 1, 1966, in 3 CONsTrruTIONS OF NATIONS 361-62 (A. Peaslee rev. 3d ed.
1968).
199. S. STROMHOLM, supra note 195, at 58.
201. Id. at 55.
202. Id.
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(2) the "right to defend one's personality:"2 0 3 "the protection
of a person's life, body and health, the protection of intellectual
property, the protection of the free will, of a person's feelings and
personal relations;"2 0 4 and
(3) the "right to defend one's individuality. "205 This refers to
"the protection of three distinct spheres,"2 0 6 that is, the "sphere of
individuality,"2 0 7 the "private sphere,"2 0 8 and the "sphere of
intimacy."2 0 9 The rights protected under the first sphere include
"the right to a person's name" and "likeness," 2 10 the "right to a
person's honour and reputation, "211 and "the right to have one's
descent established."2 12 The "sphere of intimacy"2 1 3 is distinguished from the "sphere of privacy" 2 14 in that the former refers to
"protection against any person trying to have access to letters,
diaries, personal notes or, more generally, any facts which a person
has a reasonable interest in keeping secret,"2 1 5 and the latter refers
and discloto protection "against any prying into, surveillance of
' 216
sure of private facts, independently of their character. "
In France, it has been established that "the notion of droits de
la personnalite is far wider than that of privacy." 21 7 Professor Nerson, a leading authority in the field, in urging that "the list of
personal rights" be "left open,"2 1 8 has observed that the right of
the personality is designed to protect:
(1) "interests in the notion of individuality:" 2 19 "the interests
relating to a person's name, domicile, status, legal capacity and
22 0
profession;"
2 21
(2) "interest" in "bodily integrity;"
203. Id.
204. Id. at 55-56.

205. Id. at 55.
206. Id. at 56.
207. Id.

208. Id.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 57.

at 49.
at 51.
at 50.
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(3) interests relating to moral elements of the personality: "the
right to a person's likeness, to secrecy and honour, the moral rights
of authors, rights to personal or family
souvenirs, family tombs and
22 2
the rights of family law in general."
The conclusion would, thus, appear clear that the fuller protection of a civic order-in the sense of rights to the utmost freedom of choice and personal autonomy-is emerging, both transna223
tionally and nationally.
222.

Id.

223. See THE YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 56, at 23-30, 308-26; U.N. Report on
Privacy, supra note 80, at 10-54; PRIvACY AND THE LAW (1970) (A Report by Justice,
i.e., the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists); Brittan, The
Right of Privacy in England and the United States, 37 TUL. L. REv. 235 (1963);
Dworkin, The Common Law Protection of Privacy, 2 U. TASM. L. REV. 418 (1967);
Gutteridge, The ComparativeLaw of the Right to Privacy, 47 L.Q. REv. 203 (1931);
Storey, Infringement of Privacy and its Remedies, 47 AUSTL. L.J. 498 (1973); Walton,
The Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy, 47 L.Q. REV. 219 (1931); Weeks,
Comparative Law of Privacy, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 484 (1963); Yang, Privacy: A
Comparative Study of English and American Law, 15 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 175
(1966).
Although the concept of civic order or its functional equivalent could be developed to meet any particular problems associated with informational privacy, demands are insistent in many communities, especially highly industrialized ones, that
more detailed prescription be formulated to deal with manifold problems arising
from increasing technological and corporate threats to informational privacy. On the
global level this concern is manifested in the United Nations effort to consider the
question of human rights and scientific and technological development. See note 138
supra.
Regionally, it is exemplified by Resolution (73) 22 on "the protection of the privacy of individuals vis- -vis electronic data banks in the private sector," adopted by
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 26 September 1973.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROTECTION OF THE PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALS VIS-A-VIS
ELECTRONIC DATA BANKS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (1974). Other examples include

the European colloquy on privacy and the Nordic Conference on Privacy. See notes
144-49 supra and accompanying text.
On the national level, the United States offers an exellent example. Intense demands for new prescriptions protecting informational privacy are dramatized by the
proliferation of privacy bills introduced before the Congress. Senator Jackson gives
this summation:
The Ninety-Third Congress, which ended in December, has been referred
to as the "privacy" Congress because of the legislation it grappled with
-over two hundred bills-in an attempt to regain for each person the right
to privacy, the right to know what information is being kept, and thus the
right to make choices about his or her life. The bills covered a wide area,
including Army surveillance, government record-keeping, criminal-arrest
records, federal employees' polygraphs, the Census, financial records, mailing lists, freedom of information, social-security numbers, a privacy commission, income-tax returns, and telephone communications.
Jackson, Privacy and Society, THE HUMANIST 30 (May/June 1975). Of the statutes
that have been enacted to date, the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat.
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TiiE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PUBLIC
AND CIVIC ORDER

The degree to which effective application of the existing prescriptions for the establishment and protection of civic order can be
secured will depend in large measure upon how human rights in
general are protected and fulfilled, and how effectively the constitutive processes of authoritative decision are mobilized on behalf
of the necessary policies. We have emphasized the mutual dependence of public and civic order throughout the world community.
The institutions specialized to public order can be expected to
exert a decisive impact on the freedoms of choice which are exercised in the civic sector. The scope of these freedoms may be wide
or narrow. In turn, any commitment of public order to human
rights cannot continue unless the civic order is devoted in theory
and practice to these fundamental policies.
As it is often somewhat loosely phrased, the goals of a free
society depend upon maintaining a vital balance between the
spheres of governmental and civic activities. In previous pages we
have sought to delineate these relationships with some precision,
particularly the interplay between basic allocations of authorized
power and the demands, expectations and identities of the innumerable individuals and groups who comprise the world body politic. If the future is to move toward a commonwealth of human
1896, effective December 31, 1974, is of paramount importance. In brief, the law
provides individuals "the right to know they are the subjects of a file, to examine its
contents, to challenge its contents, and to correct inaccurate, incomplete, or out-ofdate information." Jackson, supra, at 31. Mention may also be made of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970), which is designed to
eradicate abuses in buying and selling of personal information. To facilitate control
over the flow of personal information, the Act accords individuals access to their files
in consumer reporting agencies and creates a procedure for the correction of errors.
See generally Fed. Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); Computer Privacy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Ad. Prac. and
Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Retail
Credit Co. of Atlanta, Ga., Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of
Privacy of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 16,
1968); The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (July 26-28, 1966); Goldwater, Jr., Bipartisan Privacy, 1 Civ. LIB. REV.
74-78 (Summer 1974).
On comparable efforts in other territorial communities, see THE YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 56; PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, supra note 56; U.N. Report on Privacy, supra note 80, at 41-54; S. STROMHOLM, supra note 195, at 167-77; Dworkin,
The Younger Committee Report on Privacy, 36 MOD. L. REV. 399 (1973).
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dignity it will be necessary to sustain and to extend a dynamic
equilibrium of forces between public and civic order on behalf of
human rights.
It is apparent from the past that a crucial factor is the expectation of violence. In our interdependent yet divided world, if expectations of violence continue to escalate, strong demands in support
of coercive public order will persist, and the resulting expansion of
government operations will in all probability restrict the scope, and
cripple the vigor, of civic order. On the other hand, if expectations
of large-scale violence are reduced, the scope of civic order will be
relatively inclusive, differentiated and determined to hold its own.
For instance, coalitions of governmental and civic forces will modify either public or private monopolies that adversely affect the
aggregate pattern of choice.
In passing we note that although the probable future of military and police activities shows little prospect of their diminishing,
no one can justifiably insist that his image of tomorrow is infallible.
Common awareness of peril can be expected to sustain a sense of
urgency among all who exert any significant influence on public
and civic decisions and choices throughout the globe. Human
rights would gain from any relaxation in the world military-police
arena. Issues relating to human rights provide a cluster of programs capable of arousing intense demand for a more satisfactory
quality of life.
Interwoven with the expectation of violence and with other
factors influencing human rights is the evolution of science and
technology. There are no sure grounds for asserting that science
and technology will cease to expand, so long at least as the social
process continues to function. The impacts of technological innovation on human rights are complex and contradictory. It is possible
to demonstrate for example that the overall effect of technical
change on "feudal" societies has been to generalize demands in the
name of social justice based on equality of respect for basic human
identity. These demands are promoted in societies where the class
or caste structure is highly stratified and where social mobility is
low. A new division of labor means that operations are diversified
in new ways. Among groups the focus of attention is more variegated, and distinctive expectations generate novel demands and
identifications. Resulting coalitions are less sanctified by tradition
and more open to changes that enlarge the circle of active and
effective participants in the process of decision.
These movements do not march in one direction. Some inno-
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vations increase the span of knowledge, planning and direction on
the part of top elites in governmental, economic, ecclesiastical and
other organizations. In turn, centralizing tendencies may be counteracted by decentralizing tendencies and by demands to deconcentrate control at any level of authoritative decision. The civic
order may be strengthened as knowledge is more widely shared
and activities are effectively executed in new places or by new
groups. Tendencies toward a nondifferentiated society, in turn,
may promote recentralizing, monopolistic and regimenting trends,
with adverse consequences for pluralism and individuality.
As a reminder of dynamic and structural forces, we recall the
relationship between monarchy and the development of modern
institutions of participatory and limited government. Monarchs
were supported against other territorial magnates by expanding
commercial, industrial and financial elements of the population.
They developed some of the institutions, such as parliaments and
constitutional restrictions, that widened the scope of protected
choice.
In the next few decades a crucial question is whether science
and technology will be made available at creative centers throughout the globe, or whether, in substance, the dominance pattern
df today will continue. In no trivial degree the range of choice open
to the world's population will depend on shared knowledge conjoined with determination to execute population policies that harmonize with a selected level of resource utilization.
The future vitality of civil order will be deeply affected by the
intelligence and strength of private organizations. Since government structures are territorially oriented, they are easily seen as
comprehensive and hierarchical. By contrast the civic order is a
welter of people and projects. It is no surprise to find that the
bureaucratizing tendencies of government are encouraged and that
the sheer weight of public order tends to encroach on the social
process as a whole. If civic order is to protect itself, it must engage
in counter-organizations that mobilize prompt and intense commitment.
Recent and impending communication changes provide tools
that may be used for the effective defense of civic order. The expansion of the physical, biological and cultural sciences has already
nurtured a vast and growing network of scientists, engineers,
technicians and knowledge institutions. Colleges, universities,
academies and research bureaus do not necessarily depend on government. Even in countries where these institutions are governmentalized, they usually exhibit degrees of independence that jus-
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tifies putting them in a relatively depoliticized sphere. In advanced
industrial and pluralistic societies, knowledge institutions coexist
with multiple political parties and thousands of interest groups.
Specialists in the legal, social and related policy sciences can be
drawn upon to assist in formulating policy goals and strategies by
every group. If research and storage facilities are accessible, the
many participants located in the civic order acquire the cognitive
maps necessary to influence public and private choices and decisions. The expanding sciences of culture provide an improving
basis for strategies designed to attract the interest of all strata of
society in the formation and execution of collective policy. The
fundamental implication is that the future of human rights is interdependent with the simultaneous growth of knowledge and
commitment.

